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I. Introduction 
As the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 continues to 
reverberate across the global economy,1 financial regulation 
remains at the forefront of public discourse.2 The underlying 
causes of the crisis still generate controversy.3 By any measure, 
however, the financial institutions at the center of the financial 
crisis are special for many reasons.4 Increasingly, these businesses 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., ADAIR TURNER, BETWEEN DEBT AND THE DEVIL 213 (2015) 
(“Seven years after the 2007–2008 financial crisis the world’s major economies 
are still suffering its consequences.”); Maximilian Walsh, Financial Crisis Still 
Not Over Seven Years After Lehman Brothers, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV. (June 3, 
2015), http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/financial-crisis-still-not-over-seven-
years-after-lehman-brothers-20150603-ghfmkn#ixzz3pijkm4di (last visited Dec. 
11, 2016) (“The Great Recession—the one we were not supposed to have—is now 
seven years old and, despite the best efforts of an army of professional economists, 
recovery remains tentative.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Donna Borak, Donald Trump, Jeb Hensarling Meet on Dodd-Frank 
Alternative, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-
trump-jeb-hensarling-meet-on-dodd-frank-alternative-1465335535 (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2016) (highlighting the debate over Jeb Hensarling’s plan to repeal 2010 
Dodd–Frank law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. Compare Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 
Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2011) (assigning primary cause of 
the financial crisis to derivatives deregulation), with Steven A. Ramirez, The 
Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic 
Perspective, 45 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 669, 720 (2014) (“[A]t bottom, massive 
securities fraud defines the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and led to an historic 
financial collapse.”). The financial crisis of 2008 was a highly complex event and 
its causes are similarly complex. See generally STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS 
CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW 
(2013) [hereinafter RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM] (comprehensively identifying 
all legal and regulatory flaws contributing to the financial crisis). Sound risk 
management in the financial sector could apply to mitigate many if not all of these 
putative causes. 
 4. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in THE LAW OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 57 (5th ed. 2013) (debating whether banks are “special” enough to 
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demonstrate a uniquely “public” character.5 While historically 
some financial firms may have organized as partnerships6 and the 
consequences of their decision-making perceived as “private,”7 in 
the contemporary period, the great financial crisis reveals that 
decisions made in the inner-sanctum of these businesses may 
adversely affect domestic and international economies and the 
public at large.8 Many such institutions engineered and invested 
in high risk financial instruments that ultimately generated large 
losses.9 These losses triggered a run on the shadow banking 
sector10 and later crippled the conventional banking sector and 
spelled calamity for the global economy.11 Ultimately, the entire 
                                                                                                     
receive unique regulatory treatment). 
 5. In conventional corporations jargon, describing a business as “public” 
intimates that the company has registered securities with the Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for sale to the public. This Article invokes a more 
creative understanding of “publicness.” See infra Part III.A (exploring the concept 
that institutions perceived as “systemically important financial institutions” or 
“too big to fail” may have incentives to internalize the benefits of excessive risk 
taking and export the negative consequences; these negative externalities may 
spill over to the broader domestic and international communities). 
 6. See, e.g., LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS 15 
(2009) (describing the history of the ownership structure of Goldman Sachs 
Group, Inc.). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Part III.B (explaining private transactions that are exempt 
from federal regulations). 
 9. See infra Part III.B (describing how exotic derivatives allowed banks to 
re-sell debt absent federal oversight). 
 10. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 
458, SHADOW BANKING, at 1 (2010), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/ 
research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (explaining how “the shadow banking system 
provide[s] sources of funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term 
assets into money-like, short-term liabilities”). There is no universally agreed 
upon definition for shadow banking. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow 
Banking: Inaugural Address for the Inaugural Symposium of the Review of 
Banking & Financial Law, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 623, 626 (noting that 
“we lack a concrete definition of shadow banking” while also emphasizing that “a 
high level of institutional demand for (especially) short-term debt instruments” 
was a critical factor in the growth of what is now “known as the ‘shadow banking 
system’” (citation omitted)).  
 11. See TYLER ATKINSON ET AL., DALLASFED, HOW BAD WAS IT? THE COSTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2007–09 FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (July 2013), 
https://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1301.pdf (estimating 
total cost of crisis in United States alone at up to fourteen trillion dollars).  
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financial sector benefited from the federal bailout of the industry.12 
Remarkably, the homogenous demographic make-up of the senior 
management teams13 changed very little after the financial 
crisis.14  
For almost a century, a complex web of federal legislation was 
purportedly designed to protect the general public from the 
negative consequences of financial institutions’ business 
decisions.15 Banking laws for example, include specific capital and 
reserve requirements, governance mandates, and detailed 
licensing standards, to reduce systemic risk.16 Federal securities 
laws include an intricate mandatory disclosure framework for 
public companies to protect investors and to promote efficient and 
transparent markets.17 
Commentators frequently posited that the culture within 
financial firms encouraged flouting rules.18 Many claimed that the 
insular settings reinforced biases and encouraged excessive 
                                                                                                     
 12. For example, the Federal Reserve System lent trillions to 407 financial 
institutions during the darkest days of the crisis. See Phil Kuntz & Bob Ivry, Fed’s 
Once-Secret Data Compiled by Bloomberg Released to Public, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
23, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-23/fed-s-
once-secret-data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016) (reporting that total federal lending reached sixteen trillion dollars) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN THE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY AND AGENCIES AFTER THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
10, 15 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653814.pdf. 
 14. See generally EMMA JORDAN COLEMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A FAIR 
DEAL FOR TAXPAYER INVESTMENTS 1 (Sep. 2009), https://cdn.american 
progress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/09/pdf/public_directors.pdf (finding 
that one year after the financial crisis “92 percent of the management and 
directors of the top 17 recipients of TARP funds are still in office”). 
 15. See id. at 4 (introducing the Troubled Asset Relief Program intended to 
rescue failing financial systems). 
 16. See id. at 8 (attempting to create a central federal bank to increase 
market liquidity by cutting rates). 
 17. See id. at 5 (restoring trust and public confidence is critical to maintain 
future market stability). 
 18. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
xix (2011) (indicating that the primary government inquiry into the causes of the 
financial crisis found that “stunning instances of governance breakdowns and 
irresponsibility” within financial firms drove all aspects of the crisis as a key 
cause). 
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risk-taking across financial markets.19 Unprecedented 
compensation20 and brazen behavior, buttressed by perceptions 
that decisions made on behalf of the firm would have limited 
consequences for individual senior managers, created an 
environment devoid of accountability.21 The fact that these 
institutions sported little cultural diversity did not escape notice.22 
A veil of “privateness” obscured many of the complex financial 
products and transactions that facilitated the crisis.23 Regulators 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis: Before the 
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) (claiming unregulated, low interest rates 
encouraged consumer borrowing and excessive leverage); Viral V. Acharya & 
Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 195 
(2009) 
[Financial institutions] had temporarily placed assets—such as 
securitized mortgages—in off-balance-sheet entities, so that they did 
not have to hold significant capital buffers against them . . . [and that] 
the capital regulations . . . allowed banks to reduce the amount of 
capital they held against assets that remained on their balance 
sheets—if those assets took the form of AAA-rated tranches of 
securitized mortgages. Thus, by repackaging mortgages into mortgage-
backed securities, whether held on or off their balance sheets, banks 
reduced the amount of capital required against their loans, increasing 
their ability to make loans many-fold. The principal effect of this 
regulatory arbitrage, however, was to concentrate the risk of mortgage 
defaults in the banks and render them insolvent when the housing 
bubble popped. 
Id.; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011) 
(describing the assumption that “too big to fail” institutions will receive 
public financial support during economic crises). 
 20. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 247 (2010) (discussing how executives’ insulation from losses 
leads to a disregard for long-term risk-taking effects).  
 21. See generally MARY K. RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE 
CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 1–28 
(2017); Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 
88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 227 (2013) [hereinafter Governing Financial Markets] 
(discussing how federal government bailouts coupled with unregulated controls 
encourage directors to make risky management decisions). 
 22. The United States Government Accountability Office found that as of 
2011 senior managers in the financial sector were eighty-nine percent whites and 
seventy-one percent males. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 
10, 15. These numbers changed little from the numbers prevailing before the 
Great Financial Crisis at the senior manager level. Id. 
 23.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at xx (indicating that 
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and lawmakers deemed large financial institutions to be “too 
sophisticated to regulate” and acted to exempt them from 
regulation.24 Notwithstanding the litany of existing federal 
regulation, expanding notions of “privateness”—and concomitant 
deregulation—dominated the pre-crisis period.25 Even financial 
institutions that were publicly-traded companies successfully 
evaded conventional disclosure mechanisms for financial 
instruments that were too complex to depict.26 When the crisis 
erupted in the fall of 2007, both public and private institutions 
clamored to gain direct or indirect access to federal bailout funds.27 
The crisis revealed flaws in federal regulation of financial 
institutions’ risk management oversight.28 
For decades, scholars have posited that introducing greater 
diversity among decision-making authorities, such as the board of 
                                                                                                     
major financial institutions were able to hide high leverage ratios from public 
investors).  
 24. See id. at xviii (explaining that regulating major financial firms was 
thought unnecessary because self-preservation supposedly shielded them from 
fatal risk-taking). 
 25. See id. at xx (“Key components of the market . . . were hidden from 
view . . . We had a 21st-century financial system with 19th-century safeguards.”). 
 26. See id. at 8 (depicting the increasingly complex financial instruments 
that “became too hard to ‘untangle’” within the securities market). 
 27. See id. at 256 (“[A] handful of banks were bailing out their money market 
funds and commercial paper programs in the fall of 2007 . . . .”).  
 28. As used in this Article, the term risk management means the 
mechanisms by which the business enterprise manages all risks facing the 
enterprise. Thus, it transcends the mere use of financial instruments to hedge 
portfolio positions and is closely associated with enterprise-wide risk 
management (ERM). See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide 
Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 571, 586 
(2008) (defining enterprise-wide risk management as “enhanced financial 
management through enhanced identification and management of all the risks 
facing the corporation” and showing that “[t]his systematic and comprehensive 
approach to risk management has been empirically tested and the results show 
that ERM delivers upon its theoretical promises”). Congress and the financial 
regulators enhanced ERM regulatory requirements in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. See Kristin Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: 
Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 
63 (2011) [hereinafter Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act] (stating that risk 
management “involves organizational processes that generally include risk 
identifying, measuring, and mitigating procedures”). 
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directors and senior executives, could lead to superior outcomes.29 
As Christine Lagarde, former Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Finance and Employment of France and Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) eloquently argued, if “Lehman 
Brothers had been ‘Lehman Sisters,’ today’s economic crisis clearly 
would look quite different.”30 Referencing a study examining a 
sample of banks around the world that demonstrates that less than 
twenty percent of bank board members are women and only three 
percent of bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are women,31 
Lagarde described the need for greater gender diversity on 
financial institution management teams.32 Former Citigroup Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) Sallie Krawcheck shared similar 
reflections, positing that in her experience “diverse teams . . . tend 
to make more effective decisions . . . [because] they bring in more 
perspectives.”33  
While examples of egotism and bravado abound,34 critics posit 
that these anecdotes only demonstrate well-established moral or 
                                                                                                     
 29. See infra Part II (finding that maintaining homogenous groups will draw 
unoriginal ideas and provide a stagnant information base). 
 30. Christine Lagarde, Women, Power and the Challenge of the Financial 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/opinion/ 
11iht-edlagarde.html?dbk (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 31. Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Speech at the 
Institute for New Economic Thinking: Financing and Society (May 6, 2015).  
 32. See id. at 1 (“[E]stablishing a culture where ethical behavior is rewarded 
and where lapses in ethical integrity are not tolerated. More women would also 
help. Several studies have shown female leadership is more inclusive.”). 
 33. Sallie Krawcheck, How “Lehman Siblings” Might Have Stemmed the 
Financial Crisis, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 6, 2014, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/fnewshour/making-sense/how-lehman-siblings-might-have-
stemmed-the-financial-crisis/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. Consider, for example, the email messages of Fabrice Tourre, a creator 
of the infamous Abacus transaction. See Chris V. Nicholson, Fabrice Tourre: 
Fabulous or Fatally Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:49 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/fabrice-tourre-fabulous-or-fatally-flawed/ 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“The whole building is about to collapse anytime 
now . . . . Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] . . . standing in 
the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without 
necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstrosities!!!”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the 
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ethical deficiencies in the cowboy culture of Wall Street. Scholars 
long ago began finding benefits from well-managed diversity but 
some argue more evidence is needed to make the case in favor of 
greater diversity.35 The challenges that all businesses face with 
respect to decision-making and managing risk introduce a set of 
questions that merits exploration. When one considers the risk 
management failures36 that large and systemically important 
                                                                                                     
Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
1209, 1226 (2011) (“This emotional and social account meshes fairly well with 
what we observe inside highly competitive financial firms. There is a strong 
emotional emphasis on team building and bonding—fraternity-like excesses 
included.”); 
Recall the claim that the bankers’ culture is of-the-moment and bows 
to the innate legitimacy of the market mechanism, seeking an 
unquestioning synchronicity with it . . . this view probably cannot be 
construed as a belief in the unerring accuracy of the market at any 
given moment so much as a Hayekian view of the necessary freedom of 
persons and firms to be tested in the crucible of the marketplace. 
Id. at 1237. 
 35. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. FIN. 85, 85–87 (2000) (collecting sources regarding the advantages of a 
diverse workforce). More recently, scholars recognize that while well-managed 
diversity may lead to superior board performance, the empirical data on the mere 
presence of diverse board members is mixed. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. 
Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference 
Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 393 (2014) (“Although empirical research has 
drawn much-needed attention to the underrepresentation of women and 
minorities on corporate boards, it has not convincingly established that board 
diversity leads to improved financial performance.”); Lissa Lamkin Broome & 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432–33 (2008) (“Recent quantitative studies primarily test 
for a relationship between board diversity and various measures of corporate 
performance. . . . [S]tudies find evidence that . . . board diversity positively affects 
firm performance. Other studies, however, find no support for this theory.”); Lisa 
M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and 
Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 593 (2006) 
(summarizing the empirical data addressing the impact of diversity contingent 
upon the number of women in the boardroom). We do not address this debate 
regarding general board diversity in this Article, instead focusing on the potential 
benefits of diversifying the financial sector from top to bottom, that is, from the 
boardroom down to rank-and-file workers. 
 36. See Kristin N. Johnson & Steven A. Ramirez, New Guiding Principles: 
Macroprudential Solutions to Risk Management Oversight and Systemic Risk 
Concerns, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386, 426 (2014) (recognizing continued reliance 
on corporate governance-oriented reforms will ultimately increase market 
disruptions and recounting risk management failures before and during the 
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financial institutions endured during the financial crisis,37 these 
questions become all the more poignant.  
To address shortcomings in federal regulatory oversight and 
the risk management failures, Congress adopted the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–
Frank Act).38 The Dodd–Frank Act introduces many 
transformative risk oversight policies.39 Among the reforms, 
Congress created an obligation for financial regulators to assess 
the gender and racial diversity policies of financial institutions.40 
This Article focuses on Section 342(b)(2)(c) of the Dodd–Frank Act 
which directs each federal financial regulatory agency to assess the 
diversity policies and practices of entities regulated by the 
agency.41 The Article concludes that the Dodd–Frank Act 
appropriately focused on diversity as one mechanism to achieve 
superior risk management in the financial sector, and that 
regulators should more aggressively implement Congress’s 
statutory directive. 
Part II of this Article focuses on the growing empirical 
evidence in the psychology, finance, and management literature 
that demonstrates that cognitive biases influence group 
decision-making and that well-managed cultural and gender 
diversity can breakdown these cognitive biases. In terms of 
finance, this translates into superior risk management as diverse 
groups hold more heterogeneous perspectives on risk, ethics, and 
market decisions in a way that can lead to superior outcomes on 
these issues. 
                                                                                                     
financial crisis).  
 37. See Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 28, at 71–72 
(describing risk management failures of various firms and subsequent solvency 
crises during the period 2007–2011).  
 38. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreet 
reform-cpa.pdf.  
 39. See id. § 111(a) (enhancing supervision and regulation through 
establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council).  
 40. See id. § 342(a)(1)(B) (mandating the formation of the Office of Minority 
and Women Inclusion to develop standards for racial, ethnic, and gender 
diversity).  
 41. See id. § 342(b)(2) (requiring the agency administrator and Office of 
Minority and Women Inclusion Director to design implementation procedures and 
remedies resulting from violation). 
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Part III posits that increasingly blurred lines challenge our 
understanding of private businesses. Increasing federal regulation 
illustrates a trend toward presumptions that systemically 
important financial institutions, in particular, are public in 
nature, even if private by design. The macroeconomic significance 
of large financial institutions justifies more stringent 
macroprudential regulation across the financial sector. 
Part IV offers a brief survey of the issues at the center of 
financial markets regulation: academics’ understanding, 
practitioners’ experience, and regulators’ best efforts to identify, 
implement and enforce risk management policies intended to 
promote macroeconomic stability and macroprudential risk 
management. Sound risk management in the financial sector plays 
a key role in dealing with regulatory and legal challenges arising 
from the increased public stakes in banking and finance. 
Part V of this Article examines the Congressional mandate for 
imposing an obligation for regulatory agencies to “assess” the 
diversity policies and practices of financial institutions regulated 
by the agency. Part VI contends that the transformative changes 
in financial markets coupled with risk management lessons from 
the recent crisis demand a more aggressive interpretation of 
financial market regulators’ obligations to “assess” diversity at 
financial institutions. This Part of the Article posits that the 
regulators should use their traditional authority to stem unsafe 
and unsound banking practices (and similar prudential 
regulations) to encourage more diversity in the financial sector. 
Otherwise, the regulators risk undermining Congressional efforts 
to mitigate risk management challenges in financial markets and 
ensure macroeconomic stability and macroprudential regulation.42 
Section 342, while not suggesting that the increasing diversity 
alone solves risk management oversight concerns, offers a partial 
response to known risk management weaknesses in senior 
management teams in the financial sector.43 Congress correctly 
                                                                                                     
 42. Enhanced risk management figured prominently in the Dodd–Frank Act. 
See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act §165(h)(3)(A) (requiring certain systemically important 
financial institutions to form independent “enterprise-wide risk management 
committees”). 
 43. Long before the financial crisis scholars debated the business benefits of 
diversity:  
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identified a major shortcoming in the corporate governance of the 
financial sector. According to the joint standards promulgated by 
the federal regulatory agencies,44 Section 342’s mandate will only 
require a voluntary self-assessment of diversity-oriented risk 
management initiatives.45 This Article demonstrates that federal 
regulatory agencies’ interpretation of Section 342 frustrates 
Congress’s intentions regarding diversity as a risk management 
tool. At best, agency efforts stymie or undermine the potential for 
the statutory mandate. At worst, the federal regulatory agencies’ 
interpretation leaves Section 342 completely impotent creating 
greater potential for macroeconomic destabilization.46 As such, an 
                                                                                                     
The point here goes back to my metaphor of the firm as a nexus of 
negotiations. The promotion of diversity may or may not hold a position 
of power within the firm. If I am right [about potential costs] its power 
rarely will be great. Simple demands of adherence because of the 
rightness of the cause are unlikely to provoke a cooperative response 
among those who disagree on (perhaps self-serving) principled 
grounds.  
Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: 
Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1615, 1642 (2004); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest 
Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s Boardrooms and What to 
Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 (2004) (“CEOs play the game of 
homosocial reproduction when they select directors . . . [b]ut, because board 
diversity can improve corporate governance, racial reformers may find many 
allies . . . in this arena.”). 
 44. See Final Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for 
Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the 
Agencies, 80 Fed. Reg. 33016 (June 10, 2015) [hereinafter Joint Guidelines] 
(discussing the contentious public commentary over the standards promulgated 
by the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/FR-2015-06-10/pdf/2015-14126.pdf. The Article refers to this group of 
regulatory agencies as the “financial regulators.” Id. 
 45. See infra Part V (providing a detailed explanation of the Joint Standards 
that apply to regulated entities). 
 46. Under a law and macroeconomics approach, the focus is on the 
relationship of law and regulation to macroeconomic performance. See Steven A. 
Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 
519 (2003) (“[L]aw can further economic output and other macroeconomic goals.”). 
Macroprudential regulation considers the use of law and regulation to secure 
financial stability on a systemic basis and therefore looks beyond prudential risk 
regulation at just single financial institutions. See Kristin N. Johnson, 
Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial 
Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 903–04 (2013) [hereinafter Macroprudential 
Regulation] (explaining systemic risk and the consequences that flow from the 
1806 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795 (2016) 
opportunity to both diversify and stabilize the financial system has 
so far been wasted.47 The simple remedy may be for federal 
financial regulators to execute their mandate, enforce the statute 
through the broadest possible regulatory powers, and consider 
cultural and gender diversity in the financial sector as a key 
mechanism to enhance risk management and legal compliance in 
the financial sector.  
II. The Empirical Foundation for Enhanced Diversity in Finance 
Scholars from a range of disciplines have long studied group 
decision-making challenges arising in part from culturally 
homogenous groups.48 Among other limitations, groupthink,49 
                                                                                                     
interconnectedness of financial institutions). Major financial institutions operate 
under pervasive public supervision because their activities can lead to severe 
financial instability with all of the negative economic consequences inherent in 
such crises, and because the largest financial firms hold a poorly defined claim on 
massive public resources for their survival. See Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge 
Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. 
REV. 405, 449–50 (2016) [hereinafter Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?] 
(arguing in favor of enhanced regulation of hedge funds given the enhanced 
publicness of their activities). 
 47. The Joint Guidelines state that they “create no new legal obligations,” 
and that the financial regulators “will not use their examination or supervisory 
processes in connection with the [Joint Guidelines].” Joint Guidelines, supra note 
44, at 33. As such, they truly constitute “lip service” and defy the plain meaning 
of the statute, which requires an “assessment” of each regulated entity’s diversity 
policies. See 15 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2) (2012) (imposing director-created standards to 
increase agency’s participation with minority-owned and women-owned 
businesses). 
 48. See, e.g., IRVING R. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 78 (1978) (discussing 
problems associated with “groupthink”). 
 49. Groupthink is “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity 
overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of actions.” 
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1238 (2003) (quoting JANIS, supra note 48, at 78).  
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herd behavior,50 and affinity bias51 challenge group decision-
making. Similarly, humans naturally fall prey to confirmation 
bias,52 overconfidence,53 and structural bias.54 These flaws in 
cognition lead to an inclination to look for and adopt information 
that confirms intuitive beliefs and a tendency toward selective 
information gathering and deference to superiors such as 
executives or managers based on perceptions that such team 
members are better informed.55 Evidence suggests that these 
tendencies can be mitigated through enhanced cultural diversity.56 
                                                                                                     
 50. Financial crises frequently arise from herd behavior—a dynamic 
whereby decision-makers rely on the decisions of others rather than just their 
own information. See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 
Q.J. ECON. 797, 800 (1992) (finding that herd behavior may explain asset price 
volatility). Commentators note that the financial crisis was an instance of 
“herd-effects” and self-reinforcing judgments derived solely from the judgments 
of others. TURNER, supra note 1, at 40. 
 51. Affinity bias results from the inability of humans to make decisions free 
of bias relating to those we share affinity with through friendship, social status, 
or other socially significant relationships. See Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and 
the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 248–49 (showing 
that affinity bias may infect board deliberations). 
 52. See id. at 265 (searching for information supporting current beliefs but 
ignoring contrary information). 
 53. See id. at 280 (pointing to “naïve realists” who falsely believe their 
decisions are always objective in nature). 
 54. See O’Connor, supra note 49, at 1265 (noting that impartial leaders may 
also cause structural faults as they state their own views but discourage dissent).  
 55. See id. at 1238 (striving for unanimity prevents individuals from 
considering alternative courses of action). 
 56. See, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 6 (2012) (finding that “companies with at least one woman on the 
board would have outperformed in terms of share price performance” and that 
“[a]lmost all of the outperformance . . . was delivered post-2008, since the macro 
environment deteriorated and volatility increased”); David A. Carter et al., 
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 
(2003) (“After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance 
measures, we find statistically significant positive relationships between the 
presence of women or minorities on the board and firm value . . . .”); Toyah Miller 
& María del Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom: Mediators 
of the Board Diversity–Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755, 
774–75 (2009) (finding that between 2002 and 2005 Fortune 500 firms with 
gender and racial diversity on boards performed better than non-diverse firms 
and finding that the link can be explained through innovation and firm 
reputation). The focus of this Article is on cultural diversity within the financial 
firms, from top to bottom. Thus, we do not address here the efficacy of board 
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In fact, discrete cultural differences exist in the U.S. with respect 
to many important issues, including risk perceptions and ethical 
sensitivities.57 
These lessons also hold true in the world of finance. For 
example, evidence supports the conclusion that greater 
participation by women senior executives may militate against 
solvency concerns for banking institutions.58 There is strong 
empirical support for the conclusion that women executives exhibit 
less over-confidence and hold different perceptions of risk relative 
to men.59 A sample of 6,729 banks during the financial crisis 
                                                                                                     
diversity alone beyond the financial sector. Compare Joan M. Heminway, Women 
in the Crowd of Corporate Directors: Following, Walking Alone, and Meaningfully 
Contributing, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59, 79 (2014) (arguing that 
increasing the number of women on boards could enhance diversity because 
“[r]esearch offers evidence that women may bring game-changing perspectives 
and proficiencies to the boardroom”), with Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity 
Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 855 (2011) 
(challenging generally the reliance on business rationales to justify increased 
board diversity and “insists that diversity advocates must pay greater attention 
to the role of social and moral justifications in the effort to diversify the corporate 
boardroom”). 
 57. For example, as early as 2007, scholars recognized that white-male risk 
perceptions were skewed. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and 
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk 
Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 465–66 (2007) (“Numerous studies 
show that risk perceptions are skewed across gender and race: women worry more 
than men, and minorities more than whites, about myriad dangers—from 
environmental pollution to hand guns, from blood transfusions to red meat.”). 
Legal scholars suggested this white-male risk perception should be balanced in 
the name of reducing bias, unfairness, and poor governance simultaneously. See 
Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity 
Rationale, 42 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 585, 594 (2011) (“This Article proposes that 
greater worldview diversity on corporate boards may lead to better governance 
and mitigate bias and unfairness in corporate decision making.”). 
 58. See Ajay Palvia et al., Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More 
Conservative and Risk Averse? Evidence from the Banking Industry During the 
Financial Crisis, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 577, 592 (2015) (concluding test results offer 
a positive correlation between female CEOs and lower risk of bank failure); 
Kristin Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial 
Firms’ Risk Oversight, 69 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29–33) 
(citing sources and studies exploring the significance of gender in the context of 
risk-management oversight) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review). 
 59. See, e.g., Jiekun Huang & Darren J. Kisgen, Gender and Corporate 
Finance: Are Male Executives Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?, 108 
J. FIN. ECON. 822, 822 (2013) (finding that “[m]ale executives undertake more 
acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives” and that female 
DIVERSIFYING TO MITIGATE RISK 1809 
revealed that banks with women CEOs or board chairmen held 
more conservative levels of capital after controlling for, among 
other attributes, the risks in the bank’s asset portfolio, the size of 
the bank, and the economic conditions in the bank’s state.60 When 
women serve as the heads of banks, the banks tend to hold greater 
amounts of capital, which enables the bank to guard against 
insolvency concerns.61 The “observed differences in capital ratios 
are economically significant and indicate that female-led banks 
hold about 5-6% more capital than male-led banks.”62 These more 
conservative levels of capital translated into a lower risk of bank 
failure.63 As such, a rigorous analysis of cultural diversity 
“complement[s] . . . evaluating the safety and soundness of 
banks.”64 Though some may argue that this finding means women 
are superior risk managers,65 we argue only that heterogeneous 
                                                                                                     
executives give earnings guidance with wider ranges); Mara Faccio et al., CEO 
Gender, Corporate Risk-Taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation, SOC. SCI. 
RES. NETWORK (Feb. 12, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2021136 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“[F]irms run by female CEOs 
tend to make [less risky] financing and investment choices . . . than . . . firms run 
by male CEOs . . . CEO transitions indicates that . . . firm [risk-taking] tends 
to . . . around the transition from a male to a female CEO (or vice-versa).”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. See Palvia et al., supra note 58, at 592 (“From a public policy perspective, 
the documented benefits of female leadership for bank stability may be of interest 
to regulators when setting future policies for promoting gender equality and the 
advancement of women in business.”).  
 61. Id. at 582 (acknowledging that the sample size is small because women 
are so underrepresented at the top of financial sector). 
 62. Id. at 592.  
 63. See id. (reporting that banks led by female CEOs hold higher levels of 
equity capital due to their control over the bank’s asset risk).  
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., JULIA DAWSON ET. AL., THE CS GENDER 3000: WOMEN IN SENIOR 
MANAGEMENT 3 (2014) (“[G]reater diversity in boards and management are 
empirically associated with higher returns on equity, higher price/book valuations 
and superior stock price performance.”). Interpreting empirical data on cultural 
diversity and bank risk management is, of course, complicated. First, as always, 
there are limits on empirical research. As with virtually all empirical studies, 
variables may be omitted; the sample size may be too small; the direction of 
causation may not be clear; and virtually all methodologies have noteworthy 
shortcomings. Id. Further, for businesses, too much risk aversion may be 
undesirable. This Article simply highlights the best evidence on the issue of 
whether risk management can be optimized through enhanced cultural diversity 
in the financial sector. 
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risk management is superior to culturally homogenous risk 
management.  
Similarly, another study of subprime lending at financial 
firms found that firms with more female representation engaged 
in less subprime lending.66 Utilizing a database of subprime 
lenders from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Professors Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn matched 
subprime lenders with non-subprime lenders by size and industry 
and found that board configuration in the two sets of firms differed 
in statistically significant ways.67 Specifically, the non-subprime 
lenders had boards with more gender diversity, longer board 
tenure, and were less busy.68 The study design mitigates issues 
relating to causation by splitting the firms into two subsets 
(subprime lenders and non-subprime lenders) and focusing on the 
explanatory variables the year prior to any firm entering the 
subprime mortgage market.69 The study finds “that board gender 
diversity adds value to a board.”70 Furthermore, “[t]he greater the 
percentage of women on the board, the less likely a firm was to 
specialize in subprime lending.”71 In short, the deterioration of 
mortgage lending standards underlying the subprime debacle may 
have been preventable had there been greater diversity on 
financial institution boards.72  
                                                                                                     
 66. See generally Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board 
Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
AN INT’L REV. 405 (2011). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 412–13; see also id. at 409 (defining busyness as the number of 
outside board seats held by each outside director divided by the number of outside 
directors). 
 69.  
[R]everse causality is less plausible, given our research design. In our 
empirical tests, all of our independent variables are collected in the 
year preceding the firm identified on the subprime list. Thus, measures 
for our explanatory [variables] in the earlier period could not have 
resulted from being identified as a subprime specialist in the 
subsequent period. 
Id. at 409 
 70. Id. at 414 (“For enhanced decision making processes, firms would be 
advised to strive to add diversity to boardrooms.”). 
 71. Id. at 413.  
 72. Id. at 405. Another recent study involving European banks found that 
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Even beyond boards and senior managers, diversity pays 
dividends in terms of risk management in the financial sector. One 
study found that female loan officers are more risk averse and 
more inclined to restrict loans to unseasoned borrowers.73 Another 
study found that female loan officers also experience lower default 
rates on loans they approve relative to male loan officers.74 These 
studies suggest that financial firms would experience gains for 
diversifying all levels of operations, not just senior management 
teams.75 
The above empirical studies also draw support from a rich 
body of empirical evidence that shows that diversity necessarily 
results in different approaches to risk. As early as 1988, 
researchers showed in experimental studies that women tend to be 
more conservative and risk averse than men.76 These findings were 
confirmed by empirical studies that investigated household 
investment behavior and personal financial decisions.77 In sum, 
according to a review of all experimental studies in the Journal of 
                                                                                                     
boards with more women had lower risks. See generally Ruth Mateos de Cabo et 
al., Gender Diversity on European Banks’ Boards of Directors, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 
145 (2012). 
 73. See Andrea Bellucci et al., Does Gender Matter in Bank-Firm 
Relationships? Evidence from Small Business Lending, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 
2968, 2968–69 (2010) (examining the impact of gender on business lending 
practices). 
 74. See Thorsten Beck et al., Gender and Banking: Are Women Better Loan 
Officers?, 17 REV. FIN. 1279, 1317 (2013) (studying the performance differences 
between male and female loan officers). 
 75. See id. at 1282–83 (“These findings suggest that not only the 
institutional and governance structure of financial institutions matters, but also 
the gender of the people operating in a given bank structure.”); see also Bellucci 
et al., supra note 73, at 2969 (suggesting that female loan officers are more risk 
averse than men in order to avoid defaults and losses for their institutions and 
maximize personal career advancement). 
 76. See Irwin P. Levin et al., The Interaction of Experiential and Situational 
Factors and Gender in a Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task, 122 J. 
PSYCHOLOGY 173, 180 (1988) (finding that women students were more risk averse 
than male students in an experimental setting). 
 77. See, e.g., John Watson & Mark McNaughton, Gender Differences in Risk 
Aversion and Expected Retirement Benefits, 63 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 52, 60 (2007) 
(“Considerable psychological evidence suggests that women are generally more 
risk averse than men . . . and the results of this study indicate that this 
heightened risk aversion influences the superannuation/retirement investment 
choices women make.”). 
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Economic Literature, “[a] large literature documents gender 
differences in risk taking; women are more risk averse than 
men.”78 This empirical reality does not necessarily suggest that 
women inherently manage risk better than males; in fact, at least 
one study suggests that the risk aversion of females may 
negatively impact earnings.79 We may, however, conclude that 
heterogeneous risk assessments, including a diversity of 
perspectives offers greater informational elaboration.80 
This empirical reality also applies to the approach of ethnic 
minorities to issues related to risk. A recent analysis of the extant 
empirical evidence on this point found that white males are the 
most aggressive demographic group in terms of investment 
behavior.81 African-American and Hispanic households also 
display more risk aversion than white households in their 
investment choices in the wake of the Great Recession.82 In 
                                                                                                     
 78. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1, 7 (2009). 
 79. See Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Men, Women and Risk 
Aversion: Experimental Evidence, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
RESULTS 1061, 1069 (Charles R.C. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008) (detailing 
studies that show, generally, systematic differences between male and female 
reaction to risk(citing HAIM LEVY ET AL., GENDER DIFFERENCES IN RISK TAKING AND 
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS (1999) (unpublished 
manuscript))). 
 80. Our theory is rooted in the work of psychologists that found group 
intelligence can exceed the intelligence of any single member, particularly when 
the group is diverse. See Anita Williams Woolley et al., Evidence for a Collective 
Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups, 330 SCI. 686, 688 (2010) 
(“[R]esults provide substantial evidence for the existence of [collective 
intelligence] in groups . . . .”). An alternative theory also supports our thesis that 
the financial regulators should take stronger steps to encourage more diversity in 
the financial sector. Specifically, some argue that males are over-confident and 
systemically underestimate risk. See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, How Men’s 
Overconfidence Hurts Them as Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14mark.html?_r=0 (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2016) (examining differences in investment behavior between women and 
men) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See James Farrell, Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors of Investors, 
in INVESTOR BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL PLANNING AND INVESTING 
117 (H. Kent Baker & Victor Ricciardi eds., 2014) (compiling and reviewing 
empirical studies focusing on the differences in investment behavior across race 
and gender groups). 
 82. See Su Hyun Shin & Sherman D. Hanna, Decomposition Analyses of 
Racial/Ethnic Differences in High Return Investment Ownership after the Great 
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addition to approaching risk differently, ethnic diversity also may 
help avoid and mitigate financial market bubbles.83 
A recent study, published in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, by a team of six economists, business 
scholars, and other academics from around the world found that 
markets with diverse participants resist price bubbles.84 The team 
constructed experimental financial markets in Southeast Asia and 
North America.85 Market participants were randomly assigned to 
participate in diverse or culturally homogenous markets.86 The 
culturally diverse markets fit true values fifty-eight percent better 
than the homogenous markets.87 In addition, the homogenous 
market overpriced assets and trader errors were more correlated.88 
This all suggests that homogenous markets are more prone to 
bubbles than culturally diverse markets.  
As the authors of the study conclude:  
Markets are central to modern society, and their failures can 
devastate people, communities, and nations. We find that price 
                                                                                                     
Recession, 26 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING 43, 57 (2015) (examining home 
ownership, risk tolerance, and education across varying demographic groups). 
 83. See Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18524, 18524 (2014) (“Our results suggest that bubbles 
are affected by a property of the collectivity of market traders—ethnic 
homogeneity.”). 
 84. See id. at 18527 (“[T]raders in diverse markets reliably price assets closer 
to true values. They are less likely to accept inflated offers and more likely to 
accept offers closer to true value, thereby thwarting bubbles.”). 
 85. See id. at 18525 (explaining how the researchers selected the geographic 
sites of the experiments to purposely exploit non-overlapping ethnic diversity in 
those two locales and to generalize their findings beyond rich, developed nations). 
In North America, the diversity tested was whites, Latinos, and African-
Americans. Id. In Southeast Asia, the researchers studied diversity in the form of 
Malays, Indians, and Chinese traders. Id. 
 86. See id. at 18525–26 (detailing how the experiment involved skilled 
traders with training in business or finance and outlining how—because the 
traders in the experiments received their earnings in cash at the end of the 
experiment—they faced incentives to trade effectively).  
 87. See id. at 18526 (“Across markets and locations, pricing accuracy is 58% 
higher in diverse markets.”). Pricing accuracy was obtained by giving participants 
all information needed to price the stocks accurately, and the initial declarations 
of value formed the baseline for trading accuracy. Id. at 18525. 
 88. See id. at 18524 (“In homogenous markets, overpricing is higher and 
traders’ errors are more correlated than in diverse markets.”). 
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bubbles are fueled by the ethnic homogeneity of traders. 
Homogeneity, we suggest, imbues people with false confidence 
in the judgment of coethnics, discouraging them from 
scrutinizing behavior. In contrast, traders in diverse markets 
reliably price assets closer to true values. They are less likely to 
accept inflated offers and more likely to accept offers that are 
closer to true value, thereby thwarting bubbles. This pattern is 
similar in Southeast Asia and North America, even if the two 
sites differ greatly in culture and ethnic composition, in what is 
implied by “ethnic diversity” and how it is operationalized.89 
In short, this study demonstrates that if the bank regulators 
are concerned with the systemic risks of bubbles they should 
aggressively seek to diversify the financial sector with the full 
panoply of tools provided by Congress.90 This would vindicate 
macroprudential regulation needs by securing less volatile 
financial markets. 
Ethics and compliance concerns also counsel in favor of 
aggressive steps to diversify the financial sector.91 Apparently the 
different approach of women to issues relating to risk also leads to 
more ethical behavior and legal compliance.92 According to one 
recent study, female CEOs exercise more conservativism with 
respect to accounting issues.93 Another study found that female 
                                                                                                     
 89. Id. at 18527. The results are based upon 2,022 transactions by 180 
traders in thirty different markets—fourteen diverse and sixteen homogenous. 
Id. The market with the lowest accuracy was the homogenous market in North 
America—i.e., the market with all white traders. Id. 
 90. See infra Part V (articulating the means by which the financial 
regulators can use the tools at their disposal to more aggressively diversify the 
financial sector). 
 91.  See William A. Weeks et al., The Effects of Gender and Career Stage on 
Ethical Judgment, 20 J. BUS. ETHICS 301, 310–11 (1999) (“[I]t appears that an 
influx of more females into the work force might improve the ethical environment 
based on how ethical problems are perceived and resolved.”). 
 92. Id. Social scientists theorize that women approach ethics differently 
based upon gender socialization. See Leslie Dawson, Ethical Differences Between 
Men and Women in the Sales Profession, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1143, 1143–44 (1997) 
(“This theory holds that general and nearly universal differences that 
characterize masculine and feminine personalities are formed in childhood and 
are incontrovertible; these in turn differentially shape the work-related interests, 
concerns, and values of the sexes.”). 
 93. See Simon S.M. Ho et al., CEO Gender, Ethical Leadership, and 
Accounting Conservatism, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 351, 366 (2015) (“Regardless of the 
measure of conservatism, we find consistent evidence that companies with female 
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board representation leads to fewer accounting restatements.94 
The authors suggest that this finding is consistent with the 
disruption of groupthink and superior group decision-making 
dynamics.95 Similarly, at least with respect to Chinese firms, when 
there is more gender diversity on the board, there is less securities 
fraud.96 Women are more likely to speak out against unethical 
behavior and blow the whistle on misconduct than males.97 
Finally, there is additional empirical evidence that African-
Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and whites have different 
ethical sensitivities.98  
These differences in ethical sensibilities suggest that business 
would be well-advised to diversify in order to assure that its 
behavior conforms to the ethical expectations of all its key 
constituencies—labor pools, supply chains, capital sources, 
                                                                                                     
CEOs report earnings more conservatively.”). 
 94. See Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Female Board Presence and the Likelihood 
of Financial Restatement, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 607, 626 (2012) (“Using a matched-
pair sample of restatement and control firms, we conducted conditional logistic 
regressions comparing the characteristics of restatement and control firms. 
Briefly, we find a significant reduction in the likelihood of financial restatement 
and the presence of at least one female board director.”). As always, the authors 
acknowledge issues related to possible omitted variables and the direction of 
causation. Id. at 626–27. 
 95. See id. at 611–13, 627 (“We draw upon the groupthink and group 
dynamics perspectives to suggest that female board presence creates an 
atmosphere in which viewpoints that may disrupt group cohesion are 
communicated and considered, and the pace of decision-making is slowed.”).  
 96. See Douglas Cumming et al., Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1572, 1573 (2015) (“Our evidence shows that gender diversity 
reduces the likelihood of being in our fraud sample and reduces the severity of the 
fraud.”). 
 97. See Iris Vermeir & Patrick Van Kenhove, Gender Differences in Double 
Standards, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 281, 290 (2008) (“[W]omen are systematically less 
tolerant towards unethical actions compared to men . . . .”); see also Joyce 
Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblower Disclosures and Management 
Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26 
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107, 113 (1999) (“Internal whistle-blowers were far more 
likely to be women than men . . . .”). 
 98. See, e.g., Costas Hadjicharalambous & Lynn Walsh, Ethnicity/Race and 
Gender Effects on Ethical Sensitivity in Four Sub-Cultures, 15 J. LEG. ETHICAL & 
REG. ISSUES 119, 128 (2012) (offering an empirical analysis of ethical variations 
across different racial/ethnic and gender groups). 
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consumers, and communities.99 This point benefits from empirical 
support that shows that firms with more diverse boards achieve 
higher corporate social responsibility ratings.100 Diversity gives 
financial firms the key to unlocking the prodigious value of an 
enhanced reputation and ethicality by assuring that no important 
constituency finds the firm’s conduct repellent and that the firm’s 
conduct fully acclimates itself to the full spectrum of ethical 
sensitivity within its operating environment.101 Therefore, the 
financial regulators should also impose more powerful 
diversification standards for the purpose of insuring greater 
compliance and higher ethical standards in the financial sector. 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Maretno Harjoto et al., Board Diversity and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS 641, 642 (2015) (“Firms could suffer both 
monetary and reputational losses from failing to align management’s interests 
with those of their stakeholders. Effective stakeholder management is a critical 
requirement for firm success.”). 
 100. 
Given that group dynamics and decision making vary depending on the 
background of the individuals serving on corporate boards, a diverse 
group of directors brings a different knowledge base, sets of 
experiences, and perspectives on society to group decision making. As 
a result, diversity increases the board’s ability to recognize the needs 
and interests of different groups of stakeholders as reflected on CSR 
performance. 
Id. 
 101. See Stephen Bear et al., The Impact of Board Diversity and Gender 
Composition on Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Reputation, 97 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 207, 207 (2010) 
Corporate reputation refers to “publics’ cumulative judgment of firms 
over time.” Research has demonstrated a broad range of benefits 
associated with a positive reputation. A good reputation enhances a 
firm’s ability to attract job applicants. Reputation affects employee 
retention as employees who feel their company is well regarded by 
external groups have higher job satisfaction and a lower intention to 
leave their organizations. A positive reputation also enhances 
corporate branding, enabling a company to use its brand equity to 
launch new products and enter new markets. Reputation can positively 
affect financial performance, institutional investment, and share price. 
A study by Mercer Investment Consulting indicated that 46% of 
institutional investors consider environmental, social, and corporate 
governance when making investment decisions, and McKinsey reports 
that institutional investors will pay a premium (12–14%) for well-
governed companies.  
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The true potential of ethnic and gender diversity to assure a 
more stable financial sector with superior risk management 
capabilities is just now beginning to emerge from the world of 
social science. For example, no proponent of well-managed 
diversity would advocate mere tokenism as a mechanism of 
unleashing the full benefits of well-managed cultural diversity.102 
Instead, diversity management requires that diverse experiences 
represent a critical mass in any group setting to allow a robust 
exchange of ideas and perspectives.103 Thus, studies regarding the 
impact of a critical mass of diverse voices are just now beginning 
to show how diversity in the boardroom leads to greater innovation 
                                                                                                     
 102. As one of us highlighted in a seminal article on diversity in business in 
2000: 
Many corporations, most notably Texaco, have suffered dire 
consequences from an inability to manage diversity. These instances, 
however, do not detract from the central thesis of this article that 
businesses are using diversity as a competitive advantage in order to 
maximize profits, and that the legal system should accommodate, 
encourage and respond positively to this new paradigm of viewing 
diversity as a strength. Instead, these instances highlight the need for 
policies that assure that business organizations truly embrace 
diversity rather than pursue policies of tokenism or tacit exclusion. The 
point is that diversity must be properly managed. 
Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, supra note 35, at 109–10. 
Indeed, the concept that diversity must be embraced through policies and the 
pursuit of best practices highlights the fundamental distinction between 
affirmative action (which focuses on bringing traditionally excluded groups into 
organizations and institutions) and diversity policies (which seek to further an 
organizations institutional mission through broadening cognitive perspectives 
and experiences). Id. at 109–24. 
 103. As Rachel Moran states: 
Tokenism is the enemy of diversity. For groups previously excluded 
from access to legal education, feelings of alienation and isolation not 
only retard academic achievement but also silence the very voices that 
are the building blocks of a diverse law school. A critical mass of these 
students is necessary to achieve a truly diverse student body that 
contributes to the robust exchange of ideas. 
Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 208 (2006) (quoting Rachel F. Moran et 
al., Statement of Faculty Policy Governing Admission to Boalt Hall and Report of 
the Admissions Policy Task Force 24 (1993)). See also Marleen A. O’Connor, 
Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The Behavioral Dynamics of 
Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 468 (2006) (suggesting that in the 
absence of a critical mass of diverse directors a single diverse member is likely to 
succumb to pressures to conform). 
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and firm performance—and such studies focusing on critical mass 
are limited by the fact that few boards include a critical mass of 
women much less ethnic minorities.104 Many prior studies of the 
impact of diversity in the world of business or finance necessarily 
fail to deal with the confounding effects of tokenism.105 Ethnic and 
racial diversity is so rare that virtually no empirical studies can 
assess the effect of a critical mass of senior managers on financial 
performance and risk management.106 
Nevertheless, insofar as the Diversity Guidelines are 
concerned there can be little doubt that in light of the 
above-referenced empirical evidence the regulators should proceed 
more aggressively with respect to the issue of enhanced cultural 
diversity in the financial sector, and fully vindicate the 
Congressional intent underlying Section 342. More diverse 
financial institutions will curtail risk through the 
multi-dimensional perceptions of risk that a diverse workforce and 
senior management manifestly bring to the table.107 Further, more 
diverse financial traders will lessen the propensity for financial 
traders in homogenous markets to generate asset bubbles108—
                                                                                                     
 104. See Jasmin Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?”, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61, 
70 (2013) (“[W]e find evidence for a U-shaped link between gender diversity on 
the board and firm performance . . . [a board] needs a critical mass of 
women . . . to realize the advantages a more diverse board may offer. We find this 
critical mass to be in the range of about 30% female representation . . . .”); see also 
Mariateresa Torchia et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From 
Tokenism to Critical Mass, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 312 (2011) (“[Our] results 
show that the Boards’ contribution to . . . innovation is higher in boards with ‘at 
least three women’: boards where women directors reach critical mass.”). 
 105. See Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1546, 1556 (2015) (reviewing 
140 studies and finding that gender diversity on boards enhances financial 
performance and accounting earnings in nations that have strong investor 
protections and enjoy high gender parity but that “less than a handful” of studies 
measure diversity through the lens of “critical mass”). 
 106. See Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from 
the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1078 (2011) (“[V]ery few of our texts 
address the issue of a critical mass of minority (as opposed to female) directors. 
In part, this reflects the simple fact that it is hard to find a public company with 
three or more minority directors.”). 
 107. See Abbott, supra note 94, at 627 (suggesting that increased firm 
diversity will inhibit or eliminate the risks of groupthink). 
 108. See Levine et al., supra note 83, at 18524 (explaining the correlation 
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which carry huge macroprudential risks for the entire financial 
sector. The financial crisis has been viewed as one of the greatest 
episodes of risk mismanagement in history.109 Diversity can 
enhance sound risk management, which itself is a proven 
mechanism for superior financial performance,110 as will be 
discussed in more detail in Part IV below. 
III. The Increasing “Publicness” of Financial Institutions 
The federal government today holds a compelling interest in 
managing the risks the financial sector poses to the general 
economy of the United States.111 The financial crisis of 2007–2009 
caused trillions in losses to the general economy and led to 
hundreds of billions in federal bailouts.112  
This Part explains how the increasing “publicness” of financial 
institutions has created the need for creative and cost-effective 
solutions. Banking and financial regulation at the federal level 
historically responded to major macroeconomic disruptions, such 
as the Great Depression.113 While financial institutions are 
generally subject to a complex web of federal regulation, these 
restrictions failed to protect the general public against the harmful 
innovations that precipitated the financial crisis and led to large 
macroeconomic losses.114  
                                                                                                     
between ethnic homogeneity and price bubbles). 
 109. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at xi–xviii (“The 
nation’s largest financial institutions gorged on levels of risk—particularly in the 
subprime (even predatory) mortgage business—unparalleled in U.S. financial 
history.”). 
 110. See Vincent Aebi et al., Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and 
Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3213, 3224 (2012) 
(finding that banks with a more independent risk management function 
outperformed other banks during the financial crisis). 
 111. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at xviii (“[I]n a modern 
capitalist state, an economic rule of law is necessary to prevent the subversion of 
capitalism arising from excessive concentrations of wealth.”). 
 112. Id. at xi–xviii. 
 113. See Ramirez, supra note 46, at 515–22 (providing broad overview and 
assessment of New Deal financial regulation). 
 114. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at 75 (“A steady 
drumbeat of deregulation, nonregulation, and misregulation paced the entire 
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This Part begins with an overview of the federal securities 
laws that attempt to regulate the “publicness” of financial 
institutions and continues by highlighting the inherent limitations 
in applying these regulations to the “private” decisions of these 
entities. For instance, the proliferation of innovative financial 
products, which were intertwined with toxic subprime mortgages, 
created pervasive negative externalities that crippled the broader 
economy.115 Yet, the existing disclosure mechanisms provided 
under the federal securities laws would likely be ineffective in 
preventing such negative externalities as these instruments are 
often too complex to depict. The vast majority of these transactions 
were also considered private and were therefore exempt from 
significant regulation.116 This Part concludes with a focused 
discussion of the banking industry because many of these 
institutions were deemed “too big to fail” and were thus given 
massive bailout payments.117 This deepened the adverse impact 
that such institutions had on the broader economy.118  
A. Federal Regulation of “Publicness” 
Financial institutions that are characterized by varying 
degrees of “publicness” are subject to an intricate web of federal 
regulation.119 More specifically, when the internal “private” 
decisions of financial institutions could adversely impact the 
general public, the federal government subjects such institutions 
                                                                                                     
causal chain of the financial crisis.”). 
 115. See id. at 8 (”Global financial liberalization permitted the migration [of] 
toxic subprime mortgages to banks around the world. Global credit markets 
ultimately collapsed under the weight of this excessive risk.”). 
 116. See Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?, supra note 46, at 424 (2016) 
(“In passing the foundational Securities Act, Congress specifically noted that the 
laws were not intended to cover transactions ‘where the public benefits are too 
remote.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933))). 
 117. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at 9. 
 118. See id. (discussing the government’s bailout of U.S. banks and 
subsequent financial losses). 
 119. See Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private?, supra note 46, at 422–25 
(providing an in-depth discussion of how “publicness” is defined under the federal 
securities laws). 
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to layers of registration requirements and restrictions.120 Banks, 
for example, are subject to significant federal oversight due to the 
economy’s reliance on these institutions for the creation and 
transmission of capital.121 The banking industry is therefore 
strongly interconnected with other financial institutions, and a 
bank failure often precipitates a financial crisis.122 As a result, 
federal banking regulations include specific capital and reserve 
requirements, governance mandates, detailed licensing standards, 
and several other mandates.123 The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) also provides government-funded insurance 
for all bank deposits not exceeding $250,000,124 which helps to 
“reduce systemic risk caused by a lack of confidence in the entire 
banking industry during times of economic distress.”125  
In addition, financial institutions that are publicly offered to 
investors, or publicly traded on an exchange, must comply with a 
web of federal legislation under the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act).126 Following the Great Depression, Congress 
                                                                                                     
 120. See id. at 438–39 (highlighting the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council’s role in determining whether an institution’s private decisions will 
impact the broader public). 
 121. See, e.g., João A. C. Santos, Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary 
Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature, 10 FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & 
INSTRUMENTS 41, 49–53 (2000) (explaining theoretical justifications for regulation 
of the banking industry). 
 122. See generally David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market 
Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015) (summarizing the market discipline 
approach for regulating the banking industry). 
 123. See generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION (3d 
ed. 2011) (summarizing and analyzing the various rules and regulations 
impacting depository institutions); Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and 
Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 
YALE J. REG. 565 (2014) (describing various disclosure mandates that are 
generally applicable to banks). 
 124. Understanding Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits (last updated Apr. 26, 2016) (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 125. Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1283, 1316 (2014) [hereinafter Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract]. 
 126. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. (last updated 
June 10, 2013) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (providing a broad overview of various 
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drafted these laws to resolve the unique investor protection issues 
that naturally arise with the sale of securities.127 Given that 
securities are intangible instruments, investors must rely on 
underlying companies to provide meaningful information 
regarding their shares.128 The unscrupulous dealings of issuers, 
including their collective unwillingness to disclose accurate 
information related to their offerings, led to billions of dollars of 
losses for the investing public in the midst of the Great 
Depression.129  
As such, Congress incorporated a mandatory disclosure 
framework within the inaugural Securities Act as it requires that 
issuers provide investors with material information with respect 
to the initial issuance of securities.130 Required disclosures include 
detailed descriptions of the use of proceeds, a discussion of the 
various management functions, an explanation of the multiple risk 
factors related with the investment, audited financial statements, 
and several other categories of information.131 With the disclosure 
of this information, investors are better equipped to optimize their 
decisions on how to best allocate their limited capital. For the sake 
of clarity, regulators do not determine the quality of a particular 
offering under these laws, but rather they equip investors with the 
                                                                                                     
securities laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 127. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated June 10, 2013) (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter What We Do] (providing a broad overview of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s history, duties, and organizational 
structure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 128. Intangible assets and instruments have been defined as “resource[s] 
which [do] not have a physical embodiment and whose industrial and economic 
exploitation gives a claim to future benefits.” Vittoro Chiesa et al., Determining 
the Value of Intangible Assets—A Study and an Empirical Application, 5 INT’L J. 
INNOVATION & TECH. MGMT. 123, 124 (2008). 
 129. See What We Do, supra note 127 (“Tempted by promises of ‘rags to riches’ 
transformations and easy credit, most investors gave little thought to the 
systemic risk that arose from widespread abuse of margin financing and 
unreliable information about the securities in which they were investing.”). 
 130. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j–77k (2012) (stating that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission may suspend trade in a security if an 
issuer’s disclosures contain false statements or omissions of material fact). 
 131. See id. § 77j (“Any prospectus shall contain such other information as the 
Commission may by rules or regulations require as being necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
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necessary information to make such determinations on their own. 
Even if investors never read these disclosures, the efficient market 
hypothesis posits that publicly released information will be 
automatically impounded into share prices, thereby enhancing the 
reliance on such prices as a true reflection of the company’s 
value.132 Issuers who fail to disclose such material information, 
either purposely or inadvertently, can be exposed to substantial 
civil liabilities under various provisions of the Securities Act.133  
With respect to the Securities Act, Congress clarified that the 
law is not designed to apply to regulate transactions where the 
“public benefits are too remote.”134 Although Congress failed to 
provide a precise definition of the term “public,” a series of SEC 
releases and Supreme Court opinions clarified that defining 
“public offerings” hinges on the status of investors, as opposed to 
the underlying characteristics of the corporation.135 In particular, 
when companies restrict ownership to elite investors who have the 
resources to adequately protect themselves, such companies are 
exempt from the arduous registration requirements under the 
Securities Act.136 The Supreme Court famously clarified the 
contours of publicness in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,137 where it 
held that an offering to those who can “fend for themselves” is a 
transaction “not involving any public offering.”138 The Court 
reasoned that if offerees have access to the same type of 
information that would be available in a registration statement, 
                                                                                                     
 132. See Burton G. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market Efficient?, 243 SCIENCE 1313, 
1313 (1989) (“[The hypothesis] states that the stock market is remarkably 
efficient in adjusting to, and reflecting in a rational way, all relevant information 
concerning individual stocks and the economy as a whole.”). 
 133. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77q (2012) (detailing 
penalties related to fraudulent registrations, disclosures, and interstate 
transactions); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78f 
(2012) (mandating that certain information must be included in registrations of 
securities and prospectuses). 
 134. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933). 
 135. See infra notes 136–142 and accompanying text (identifying a series of 
regulations and Supreme Court decisions which shaped and refined the legal 
concept of publicness). 
 136. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2016) (outlining the registration 
exemptions available to investors which meet the requirements of Regulation D). 
 137. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
 138. Id. at 125. 
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then they do not need the protections guaranteed under the 
Securities Act.139 
In 1982, the SEC provided additional guidance in constructing 
private offerings when it promulgated Regulation D.140 This safe 
harbor coined a new term, “accredited investors,” which provides a 
bright-line definition for investors who can properly fend for 
themselves.141 Such investors include individuals who earn over 
$200,000 per year, as well as a variety of institutions, such as 
banks, insurance companies, and pension plans.142 In contrast, 
issuers that offer securities to large numbers of unaccredited 
investors (also known as retail investors) must register under the 
federal securities laws.143 Thus, defining “public” in the context of 
the Securities Act entails evaluating characteristics of investors 
for which financial institutions have a prospective or existing 
contractual relationship. Assessing publicness does not extend to 
the impact that such institutions have on unrelated stakeholders 
such as employees, the environment, or the public at large.  
While the Securities Act primarily regulates the flow of 
information related to the initial issuance of securities, the 
Exchange Act regulates the disclosure of information related to 
securities traded on the secondary markets.144 Broadly prohibiting 
fraud in connection with the sale of securities is also an integral 
component of this legislation.145 Financial institutions that fall 
                                                                                                     
 139. See id. (“We agree that some employee offerings may [be exempt], e.g., 
one made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the 
same kind of information that the act would make available in the form of a 
registration statement.”). 
 140. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2016) (offering registration exemptions to 
those investors who meet certain requirements under Regulation D). 
 141. See id. § 230.501(a) (providing the definition of accredited investor). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2012) (detailing which 
information is required in a registration prospectus); see also Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012) (detailing registration requirements for trading 
securities on national exchanges). 
 144. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (“[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted 
upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a 
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and 
control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . . . .”). 
 145. See id. §§ 78j & 78f (providing auditing requirements and penalties 
associated with violations of those requirements). 
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within the definition of “public company” must comply with the 
periodic disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act.146 The 
definition of public company under the Exchange Act includes the 
following three categories of issuers: (1) issuers that have 
securities listed on an exchange;147 (2) issuers with “total assets” 
exceeding ten million dollars and classes of equity securities held 
by at least 2,000 persons (or 500 persons who are not accredited 
investors);148 and (3) any issuer that files a registration statement 
under the Securities Act.149 Financial institutions could potentially 
fall under any of these categories of public company due to their 
size, number of holders, and/or registration status under the 
Securities Act. As a result, companies must file the periodic reports 
mandated under the Exchange Act unless an available exclusion 
or exemption applies to the underlying entity.150 Thus, defining 
“public” in the context of the Exchange Act largely entails 
evaluating both the size and the number of investors of a particular 
company. Similar to the Securities Act, assessing publicness does 
not extend to the impact that such institutions have on unrelated 
third parties. 
B. Financial Innovation and Complexity 
The rapid proliferation of complex and innovative financial 
products has expanded the overall impact that certain financial 
institutions have on the general public.151 In particular, countless 
                                                                                                     
 146. See id. § 78m (detailing and outlining the periodic reporting 
requirements imposed on issuers of securities under the Exchange Act). 
 147. See id. § 78l(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer 
to effect any transaction in any security (other than an exempted security) on a 
national securities exchange unless a registration is effective as to such security 
for such exchange . . . .”). 
 148. See id. § 78l(g) (establishing a threshold at which a company must 
register its securities).  
 149. See id. § 78l(f)(1)(G) (indicating when a security is the subject of an initial 
public offering).  
 150. See id. § 78l(g) (outlining exemptions to the general periodic reporting 
requirements of the Exchange Act). 
 151. See Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the 
Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 234–51 (2010) (examining 
the explosion in financial innovation, including money market funds, junk bonds, 
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individuals, who had no prospective or existing contractual 
relationship with such institutions, have suffered dire 
consequences resulting from the supposedly “private” decisions of 
publicly traded entities. For instance, large banking institutions 
played a pivotal role in creating the instruments that precipitated 
the financial crisis.152 These institutions created and sold 
innovative financial instruments such as credit default obligations 
(CD”), credit default swaps “CD”), and other exotic derivatives.153 
These instruments essentially gave banks the power to repackage 
and sell debt to a variety of market participants, which led to a 
robust credit market that evaded significant oversight under the 
federal securities laws.154 These products initially improved the 
facilitation of credit for countless individuals.155 However, the 
growth of these markets “introduce[ed] new and unregulated types 
of leverage into the system . . . mak[ing] them very vulnerable to 
external shocks.”156 When the speculative bubbles associated with 
these instruments inevitably burst, the resulting losses to the 
general public were staggering.157  
Many of these complex transactions were considered “private 
offerings” and were thus exempt from regulation under the federal 
securities laws. Since banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, 
mutual funds, and other institutional investors are considered 
                                                                                                     
private investment funds, asset securitization, derivatives, and repurchase 
agreements). 
 152. See Stout, supra note 3, at 19–20 (2011) (arguing that the deregulation 
of OTC derivatives under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
was a major contributor to the financial crisis). 
 153. See RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM, supra note 3, at 83 (“The market for 
over-the-counter derivatives soared to $595 trillion by 2007.”); see also FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 27–38 (discussing the shadow banking system 
and its role in the 2008 financial crisis).  
 154. See id. (explaining that prior to the Dodd–Frank Act, credit derivatives 
were not subject to regulatory oversight by the CFTC). 
 155. See Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime 
Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 550 (2009) (“[T]he model enabled de facto 
income to be recognized, on a statistical basis, in order to enable the poor to 
borrow money and acquire homes.”). 
 156. Hilary Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 861, 873 (2015). 
 157. See id. at 873–74 (explaining the wide-reaching effects and economic 
damage which can result from the vulnerability of financial innovations).  
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“accredited investors,” such investors are free to trade these 
instruments without providing disclosures available to the general 
public.158 In fact, these institutional investors controlled a large 
portion of the CDO, CDS, and other niche markets, which have 
been widely identified as being the primary culprit of the financial 
crisis.159 Over-the-counter derivatives were also specifically 
exempt from state and federal regulation under the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which many have identified as 
being yet an additional culprit in facilitating the financial crisis.160 
These exemptions largely contributed to the creation of the 
“shadow banking” industry,161 which refers to a network of 
“financial intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of 
credit across the global financial system, but whose members are 
not subject to regulatory oversight.”162 While credit was 
historically created and managed by large banking institutions 
subject to prudential regulation, many OTC-derivatives created a 
mechanism for exempt entities to directly participate in such credit 
                                                                                                     
 158. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2016) (defining an “accredited investor” for the 
purposes and exemptions of Regulation D). 
 159. See, e.g., Photis Lysandrou, The Real Role of Hedge Funds in the Crisis, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e83f9c52-6910-11e1-
9931-00144feabdc0.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“On the eve of the crisis at 
end-2006, hedge funds held about 47 per cent of the $3tn worth of CDOs while 
the banks held 25 per cent and insurance companies and asset managers held the 
remaining 28 per cent.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 160. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at xxiv (“The enactment 
of legislation in 2000 to ban the regulation by both the federal and state 
governments of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives was a key turning point in the 
march toward the financial crisis.”). 
 161. See Karin Matussek, Hedge Funds Are Shadow Banks in Need of 
Regulation, Bafin Says, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 13, 2012, 6:01 PM) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-13/hedge-funds-are-shadow-
banks-in-need-of-regulation-bafin-says (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) (reporting 
comments made by Germany’s financial regulator on how hedge funds act and 
how they should be recognized) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). But see ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N, THE ROLE OF CREDIT HEDGE FUNDS IN THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: ASSET MANAGERS, NOT SHADOW BANKS 3 (2012) (arguing that 
hedge fund industry is a part of the asset management sector, as opposed to 
shadow banking and that “hedge funds generally do not engage directly in credit 
transformation”).  
 162. Shadow Banking System, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/s/shadow-banking-system.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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markets.163 These troubling loopholes under federal law permitted 
the exemption of such transactions from significant oversight, 
without considering that they would likely create negative 
externalities that would spread to the global markets.164 Thus, the 
markets that facilitated the crisis were largely opaque, which 
complicated the process of deriving an appropriate regulatory 
response.  
Even if such transactions were subject to federal oversight, the 
existing mechanisms for regulating public firms are likely 
ineffective in protecting the general public from the negative 
externalities discussed herein. Simply mandating the disclosure of 
highly complex instruments does little to protect unrelated 
stakeholders from the harms presented by such products.165 In 
fact, many highly sophisticated investors did receive disclosures 
summarizing the risks of these complex instruments, but such 
disclosures were inherently inadequate.166 As one commentator 
noted, “even when the institutions that develop these products 
honestly disclose the inherent risks to investors: the new products 
still add complexity and interconnectedness to the financial 
system, increasing the amount and obscuring the allocation of risk 
                                                                                                     
 163. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 48–49 (describing the 
deregulation of OTC markets through the 1990s and its relationship to the 
financial crisis). 
 164.   
[T]he OTC derivatives market was] unregulated and largely opaque, 
with no public reporting requirements and little or no price discovery. 
With the Lehman bankruptcy, participants in the market became 
concerned about the exposures and creditworthiness of their 
counterparties and the value of their contracts. That uncertainly 
caused an abrupt retreat from the market. 
See id. at 363–64. 
 165. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1113–15 (2008) (explaining the causes behind the 
insufficiency of disclosures). 
 166.   
[M]ost, if not all, of the risks giving rise to the collapse of the market 
for securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed, yet the 
disclosure was insufficient, in part because complexity made the risks 
very difficult to understand . . . a typical offering of these securities 
is . . . hundreds of pages . . . .  
Id. at 1110. 
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in the system as a whole.”167 Investment strategies that utilize 
derivatives are often too complex to depict, as even the most 
sophisticated of investors may encounter difficulties in fully 
understanding the associated risks.168 Deriving valuation 
mechanisms often necessitate highly complex algorithms and 
computer programs that evade human understanding.169 Overall, 
relying on such archaic disclosure mechanisms to protect investors 
from these innovative products may prove to be insufficient and 
will do little to mitigate future crises.  
Company boards have also perpetuated a perverse culture of 
shareholder primacy, which tends to embody short-term gains to 
shareholder value, without providing due consideration to long-
term stability.170 This myopic focus on short-term shareholder 
value can lead to excessive risk taking behavior on the part of 
corporate management, which could adversely affect the long-term 
interests of shareholders, as well as third-party stakeholders 
(whose interests are often intertwined with the economic interests 
of shareholders).171 In effect, boards that are making a good faith 
attempt to effectively manage their companies may be incentivized 
“to disregard the externalities of their actions.”172 With respect to 
the financial crisis, many company boards aggressively pursued 
the short-term profitability associated with riding the subprime 
mortgage bubble, without appropriately considering the long-term 
effects to firm stability, and to the economy at large.173 This 
phenomenon is exacerbated by the prevalent practice of 
                                                                                                     
 167. Allen, supra note 156, 872–73. 
 168. See generally Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure 
Information,’ and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012). 
 169. See Allen, supra note 156, at 872–73 (explaining that even honest 
disclosures do not erase the difficulties created by the complexity of the 
instruments). 
 170. See id. at 885 (describing focus on short-term gain at the expense of long-
term stability as part of the financial industry’s culture). 
 171. See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
(2012). 
 172. Allen, supra note 156, at 876. 
 173. See id. at 885 (describing the industry culture as lacking regard for 
others, uninterested in long-term stability, and focused only on the short-term). 
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compensating corporate management with company shares,174 
which can further incentivize corporate management to enhance 
the short-term value of their equity within the company.  
C. Public Subsidies for Private Institutions 
This faulty reliance on short-term shareholder value, coupled 
with the pervasive dependence on risky financial instruments, 
caused several prominent financial institutions to fail towards the 
end of 2008. Lehman Brothers, and several other firms filed for 
bankruptcy, which crippled the global economy.175 As noted by a 
case study published by Yale School of Management, when 
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman) filed for bankruptcy in 
September 2008,  
[N]ever before had such a large financial institution 
failed—its operations, clients and counterparties spread across 
the globe. Its derivative book alone consisted of more than 
900,000 contracts. Lehman’s clients and counterparties 
experienced direct effects from its failure and disclosed millions 
of dollars of potential losses as they began to account for their 
exposures, but that was only a small fraction of the impact. The 
tremors from Lehman’s demise reached well beyond its direct 
counterparties . . . Concern regarding its real estate assets, its 
large derivative book, and its significant involvement with 
collateralized debt obligations . . . soon “infected” the shadow 
banking system, contributing to a retraction of wholesale 
funding and a severe liquidity crisis for many firms, including 
many with no direct links to Lehman. 176 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 28, at 3 
(explaining that this practice encourages corporate managers to engage in risky 
behavior to inflate the short-term value of the company). 
 175. Why TARP Was Necessary, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/Why-
TARP-was-Necessary.aspx (last updated Nov. 15, 2016, 1:34 PM) (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 176. Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Andrew Metrick, The Lehman Brothers 
Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion, YALE SCH. MGMT. 2 (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593081 (last visited Dec. 13, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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As evidenced by this excerpt, when a systemically important 
financial institution (SIFI)177 such as Lehman, for example, 
experiences solvency-threatening losses, the adverse consequences 
could spread to governments, other firms, and the public at large. 
Given the adverse effects of a SIFI’s failure, the Treasury 
established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) “to help 
stabilize the U.S. financial system, restart economic growth, and 
prevent avoidable foreclosures.”178 Distressed financial 
institutions that were deemed “too big to fail” were able to request 
sizable subsidies from TARP, which allocated approximately $250 
billion to these troubled institutions.179 AIG alone was granted $70 
billion in TARP funds in order to prevent its imminent failure.180 
Proponents of these programs reasoned that such bailouts were 
necessary as the failure of these institutions would constitute 
systemic risk events that would effectively decimate the global 
economy.181  
Even still, the federal bailout of financial institutions was 
widely criticized as taxpayers, who were excluded from the private 
decision-making processes of these institutions, were forced to pay 
for their mistakes.182 Some have estimated that the Treasury has 
realized billions of dollars in losses, and that the TARP program 
could encourage excessive risk-taking by financial institutions 
since corporate boards know that they can rely on a federal bailout 
in the event of a future crisis.183 The Congressional Oversight 
                                                                                                     
 177. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d) & (i) (2012) (attempting to address the risks 
to stability posed by large financial companies). 
 178. TARP Programs, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/f 
inancial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. (crediting TARP with avoiding a second Great Depression). 
 182. See, e.g., Moira Herbst, Think the Bailout Cost US Taxpayers Nothing? 
Think Again, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/comment 
isfree/2013/may/28/bank-bailout-cost-taxpayers (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) 
(critiquing the bailout program for costing taxpayers billions of dollars and 
charging the government with painting a dishonestly rosy picture) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 183. See Halah Touryalai, Don’t Be Fooled, There’s No Profit in Bank Bailouts: 
TARP Watchdog, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
halahtouryalai/2012/04/25/dont-be-fooled-theres-no-profit-in-bank-bailouts-tarp-
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Panel similarly recognized that “TARP . . . created moral hazard: 
[v]ery large financial institutions may decide to take inflated risks 
because they expect that, if their gamble fails, taxpayers will bear 
the loss.”184 As Professor Mehrsa Baradaran similarly noted, 
In giving this aid to the large banks, the government never 
explicitly demanded anything in return, and it quickly became 
apparent that banks would not use these funds for public-
serving purposes. Instead, they shored up their balance sheets 
by saving their cash for a rainy day. Soon, the public also 
learned of bonuses given to bank executives with TARP funds. 
Clearly, the banking sector, which was not accustomed to 
meeting public needs, rejected their intermediary function—
that it was their responsibility to take these government funds 
and lend.185  
Many banks simply decided to retain TARP funds to enhance their 
internal balance sheets without appropriately using such funds to 
facilitate lending in the broader economy.186 
As demonstrated by these critiques, the federal bailout of 
financial institutions greatly expanded the extent to which such 
entities could impact the general public. Congress responded by 
passing the Dodd–Frank Act as a means to implement creative and 
cost-effective solutions to protect the general public from these 
negative externalities.187 With the passage of these laws, many 
financial institutions will necessarily have to consider the systemic 
risks of their operations, as well as the public interest in those 
operations, regardless of shareholder primacy and profit 
maximization.  
The following Part IV continues this discussion by exploring 
the contours of risk management in the financial sector and the 
                                                                                                     
watchdog/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (arguing that TARP has not achieved any 
kind of fundamental change to guard against a repeat of the financial crisis) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 184. TARP Provided Critical Support but Distorted Markets and Created 
Public Stigma, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL (Mar. 16, 2011), 
https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110401223120/http://cop.senate.gov
/press/releases/release-031611-final.cfm (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 185. Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, supra note 125, at 1322. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. (referencing the Dodd–Frank Act’s stated goal of strict oversight 
of financial institutions posing a systemic risk to the economy). 
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evolution of risk management theory. It examines the theory of 
risk management concerns and offers examples of two recent risk 
management failures. Part IV also highlights the limitations of 
various solutions proposed under the Dodd–Frank Act, and builds 
upon the growing body of empirical research that demonstrates 
that increasing heterogeneous management is a highly effective 
tool in protecting against the harms that facilitated the financial 
crisis. 
IV. Systemic Risk and Risk Management 
Over several centuries, commercial market participants have 
developed methods for addressing these types of risks. 
Contemporary innovation in financial markets, however, has 
altered the landscape of risk oversight in financial markets. This 
Part contends that mitigating risks similarly requires greater 
flexibility and creativity. Drawing on the observations in empirical 
data, this Part argues that studies evaluating the benefits of 
leadership diversity and diverse-group decision-making offer an 
important and underexplored path toward mitigating individual 
institutional risk management failures and industry-wide 
systemic risk concerns.  
A. Risk Regulation in Financial Markets 
For almost a century, state and federal regulatory agencies 
engaged in oversight of risks in financial markets.188 Scholars and 
commentators analyze regulatory oversight through a variety of 
lenses.189 While risk oversight regulation follows common 
regulatory trends, a survey of affirmative legislative and 
regulatory action reveals that innovation transforms markets and 
leads to evolutions in our understanding of risk.  
                                                                                                     
 188. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1247, 1253–55 (2014) [hereinafter Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical] 
(tracing the history of banking regulation since the Great Depression).  
 189. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, ‘Publicness’ in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339 
(2013) (depicting regulation as a public-private dichotomy). 
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Since the Great Depression, scholars have identified five 
commonly depicted periods of financial market regulation.190 Each 
of these periods offer insight into Congress’s and regulators’ 
earliest notions of risk—the ideas that (1) risk is local; (2) risk 
relates to activities; (3) insuring against risks requires capital 
buffers; (4) risk disclosures mitigate against risk; and (5) risk 
modeling illuminates risk exposure.191 Characterizing the current 
period of regulatory oversight as “regulation by hypothetical,” 
Mehrsa Baradaran identifies a final category of risk regulation 
that entails regulation predicated on agency and market 
participants’ predictions of future risk scenarios.192 Legislative 
mandates and regulatory agency actions reflect this history.193 
While evaluation of the history and development may offer a 
much needed appreciation for the shifts in risk management 
theory, a detailed history of risk regulation in banking is beyond 
the scope of this Article. A few selected, historical reflections, 
however, indicate that legislation and regulation are poised to 
adapt to developments in our understanding of genuine risks to 
better ensure the safety and soundness in financial markets.  
Critics rightly chided regulators for their parochial 
perceptions of risk and risk management across several regulatory 
periods. While unit banking may have limited the systemic risk 
concerns that animated much of the financial crisis, limiting 
banking activity for a specific bank to a particular state or 
geographic region did little to prevent banks from engaging in 
excessive risk taking. All of the thoughtfulness about isolating 
risks offered little solace to depositors who lost savings or homes 
in the bank runs in the 1920s. Congress’s and regulators’ 
willingness to adapt, though admittedly at a glacial pace, has been 
critical to maintain the international competitiveness of the 
United States banking sector.  
                                                                                                     
 190. See generally Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, supra note 188 
(tracing the history of banking regulation since the Great Depression). 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. 
 193. See id. at 1256–72 (describing various historical government measures 
implementing the different regulatory regimes). 
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Subsequent periods witnessed an erosion of Congressional and 
regulatory reliance on disclosure of banking activities that were 
limited under the National Bank Act.194 The rise of over-the-
counter derivatives provides the most prominent example of such 
a change.  
In the mid-1980s the Federal Reserve agreed to permit bank 
affiliates to engage in securities underwriting transactions.195 The 
capital markets transactions exposed the banks to market risk, 
heightening the banks’ desire to identify hedging or risk 
management strategies.196 A series of decisions by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency authorized banks to enter into and 
serve as dealers in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
transactions.197 By 1984, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
began to underscore banks boards’ obligations to manage risks by 
adopting policies requiring bank boards to periodically report on 
interest rate risk exposure.198 To facilitate ingenuity in the 
development of derivatives, market participants lobbied to exclude 
the OTC derivatives used to hedge against risk from regulatory 
oversight and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
consented.199 
In 1986, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision offered 
some guidance for employing risk management techniques such as 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, supra note 188, at 1261 
(describing this shift in banking activities and in regulation). 
 195. See Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing 
Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2250–51 (2014) (describing this shift in risk 
management as a response to increased exposure that began in the 1980s). 
 196. See id. (noting that the driving force in these developments was the 
increased exposure). 
 197. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How 
Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) 
(tracing the history of derivative regulation). 
 198. See Interest-Rate-Risk Management; Policy Statement and Final 
Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,295–96 (July 3, 1984) (establishing such reporting 
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 199. See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 
42,983, 42,985 (Oct. 23, 1985) (discussing the various types of instruments that 
will remain unregulated); Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 
Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 1, 1989) (providing a safe harbor from CFTC regulation for 
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derivatives and other off-balance sheet transactions.200 Other 
regulators proposed limits for derivatives transactions, heightened 
compliance policies, and internal controls.201 The adoption of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act imposed 
further internal controls.202 Other domestic and foreign banking 
regulators implemented similar permissive rules regarding risk 
management oversight, attempting to temper the concerns 
regarding nascent derivative products with greater internal 
controls.203  
In 1993, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
published Circular 277 and outlined the most significant sources 
of risks including market, credit, liquidity, legal, and operational 
risks.204 Regulators began to ponder whether arguments in favor 
of hedging—a risk management strategy—justified permitting 
banks, particularly depository institutions, to act as dealers and 
engage in proprietary trading in the derivatives market. The 
Circular outlined three mandatory elements for all banking risk 
management programs: (1) board oversight of risk management; 
(2) a comprehensive risk management approach, including 
detailed limits for risk taking and a system for monitoring risks; 
and (3) internal and audit controls.205  
                                                                                                     
 200. See Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, supra note 188, at 1268 
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 201. Id. 
 202. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
§ 39, 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (1991) (laying out a number of novel standards and an 
enforcement regime). 
 203. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994) (raising concerns posed by the 
risks of derivatives), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/154342.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT 
AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988) (last updated Apr. 1998) (requiring minimum 
levels of capital for international banks); Supervisory Policy Statement on 
Securities Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 4,028 (Feb. 3, 1992) (updating and revising the 
FFIEC’s policy on selection of securities dealers and requiring the establishment 
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 204. Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, OFF. COMPTROLLER 
CURRENCY (Oct. 1993), http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/bulletins/pre-
1994/banking-circulars/bc-1993-277.pdf. 
 205. BD. GOV. FED. RES. SYS., SR 93-69 (FIS), EXAMINING RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR TRADING ACTIVITIES OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1–3 
(1993). 
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Notwithstanding the march toward enhanced risk 
management oversight within individual banking institutions—
described as microprudential regulation—Congress amended the 
Commodities Exchange Act206 (CEA) to supplement the CEA and 
add the Commodities Futures Modernization Act. The newly 
adopted legislation exempted OTC derivatives transactions from 
regulatory oversight on the basis that the market participants who 
engage in these transactions are sufficiently sophisticated to 
manage risks related to these instruments.207 Even though 
subsequent acts by Congress emphasized internal controls within 
individual firms, all of these policies failed to appreciate the 
macroprudential risk management concerns burgeoning within 
financial markets. The implosion within financial markets less 
than a decade later firmly establishes that programs that focus 
exclusively on internal risk management ignore the growing risk 
management threats that reach across firms, the financial services 
industry, and the territorial borders of individual national 
jurisdictions.  
While the Dodd–Frank Act created several mechanisms to 
regulate these risk management failures, such as the 
clearinghouse mandate under Title VII,208 and increased 
regulation over SIFIs,209 these measures may be insufficient in 
preventing a future financial crisis. With respect to the new 
clearing requirement, parties must become a member of an 
authorized clearinghouse or contract with a member of an 
authorized clearinghouse in order to trade certain OTC 
                                                                                                     
 206. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4c(a)(1)–(2), 42 Stat. 
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derivatives.210 However, this new clearing mandate could serve to 
transfer and concentrate systemic risk within clearinghouse 
entities.211 With respect to the increased regulation over SIFIs, the 
Dodd–Frank Act empowered a new Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to designate a wide range of financial institutions 
as SIFIs.212 Once an institution receives this designation, it is 
subject to heightened regulatory restrictions.213 Even still, FSOC 
has made relatively few SIFI designations and the likelihood of 
private entities receiving such a designation (irrespective of their 
abilities to increase systemic risk) has significantly declined.214 
Overall, the Dodd–Frank Act seems to have complicated and 
extended the regulatory patchwork that applies to financial 
institutions, without directly addressing the increasing effect that 
these entities have on the general public.215 
With respect, however, to the specific issue of risk 
management, Dodd–Frank did include at least two provisions that 
could limit excessive risk in the financial sector without 
compromising financial performance or profitability. The first is 
the requirement that large and systemically important firms 
                                                                                                     
 210. See Governing Financial Markets, supra note 21, at 216 (explaining that 
the clearinghouse requirement “mitigates risk exposure by increasing the 
transparency in the industry and maximizing allocational efficiency”). 
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 212. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain 
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create enterprise wide risk management committees (and 
associated protections) to modulate excessive risk.216 Second, the 
diversity initiative embodied in Section 342 also holds the promise 
of enhanced financial performance as well as risk mitigation.217 In 
fact, as shown above, powerful evidence suggests that diversity 
particularly leads to superior risk management during periods of 
financial turbulence such as the financial crisis.218  
Part V summarizes the general mechanics of this provision. 
Unfortunately, as will be further discussed below, the financial 
regulators ignored this lesson and materially diluted the impact of 
the statutory provision.219 The remainder of this Article proposes 
                                                                                                     
 216. See Johnson & Ramirez, supra note 36, at 412–16 (examining multiple 
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 218. See, e.g., Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board 
Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
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 219. As one SEC Commissioner argues: 
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Final Policy Statement is woefully inadequate and fails to meet 
Congressional mandate. Thus, a good opportunity to have real positive 
impact on diversity and inclusion has been squandered. As 
implemented, Section 342 will be reduced to a mere exhortation to 
regulated entities, many of which have not shown a commitment to 
achieve diversity in their companies. 
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Dissenting Statement on the Final 
Interagency Policy Statement: Failing to Advance Diversity and Inclusion, SEC. & 
EXCHANGE. COMMISSION (June 9, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/ 
dissent-interagency-policy-statement-diversity.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) 
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to reconfigure the approach the financial regulators now take to 
diversity, and to give the financial sector a more forceful push 
towards meritocracy—in the sense that superior risk management 
through diversity may well lead to superior long run financial 
performance.220  
V. Regulating Diversity 
As explained in prior parts of this Article, risk governance 
creates clear objectives that financial institutions can ill-afford to 
ignore. Successful risk management efforts will involve the use of 
a wide array of quantitative and governance tools. Board and 
senior management diversity is indisputably one such tool that has 
already been implemented by a number of states221 as well as a 
number of other nations.222 To its credit, Congress heeded this 
learning in adopting Section 342 of the Dodd–Frank Act.223 
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Section 342 under the Dodd–Frank Act encourages greater 
diversity in the financial services industry.224 This Part provides a 
succinct description of the mechanics of Section 342, which 
generally obligates a number of federal agencies to create Offices 
of Minority and Women Inclusion.225 Such offices are charged with 
ensuring the fair inclusion and utilization of minorities and women 
in all business and activities of their respective agencies.226 This 
Part highlights the more controversial aspect of Section 342, which 
further instructs these offices to create diversity standards for 
assessing the policies of its regulated entities.227 These standards 
were finalized in June 2015.228 However, compliance with such 
standards is purely voluntary, and federal agencies have permitted 
its regulated agencies to engage a self-assessment in determining 
                                                                                                     
The law says this diversity czar will “ensure equal employment 
opportunity and the racial, ethnic and gender diversity” of the work 
force and senior management of these institutions. More ominously, 
this creature of Congress and the White House will also be charged 
with “increas[ing] the participation of minority-owned and 
women-owned businesses in the programs and contracts” of each 
agency and conducting “an assessment” of stated inclusion goals. Mull 
over that one for a minute. Having recently lived through a financial 
mania and panic caused in part by political pressure for “affordable 
housing,” Congress will now order regulators to allocate credit by race 
and gender. Isn't the point of this financial reform supposed to be to 
make regulators better judges of systemic risks, which means focusing 
on financial safety and soundness? If the Waters provision passes, 
federal regulators will have to put racial and gender lending at the top 
of their watch list when they do their checks on the banks and hedge 
funds they are regulating.  
Politicizing the Fed, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240 
52748704575304575297130299281828 (last updated June 14, 2010) (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This opinion 
ignores that Section 342 specifically forbids any mandate regarding “lending 
policies and practices of any regulated entity.” Dodd–Frank Act §342(b)(4). 
Indeed, standing alone, the assessment of diversity policies cannot “require any 
specific action” based solely on the findings of the assessment. Id. 
 224. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 342, 124 Stat. 1376, 1541–
45 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452 (2012)) (listing the relevant agencies 
expected to comply with Section 342). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. (outlining affirmative steps agencies shall take to seek diversity 
in workforce). 
 228. Id.  
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the adequacy of such compliance, which seems contrary to the 
intent of Section 342.229 
As will be further discussed below, the financial agencies 
failed in the implementation of Section 342 as the financial 
regulators adopted a weak interpretation of the Congressional 
mandate, which undermined Congressional efforts to ensure 
macroeconomic stability as well as sound macroprudential 
regulation.  
A. Mechanics of Section 342 
Several concerns inspired Congress to include Section 342, the 
Office of Minority and Women Inclusion230 in the Dodd–Frank 
Act.231 One concern was the manifest underrepresentation of 
minorities and women in the financial services industry232 and in 
government financial service agencies,233 as well as the lack of 
                                                                                                     
 229. Indeed, the architects of Section 342 in Congress issued a letter to the 
financial regulators specifically highlighting their intent to impose diversity 
mandates upon regulated entities consistent with the thesis of this Article. See 
Honorable Maxine Waters et al., Letter to Participating Financial Agencies, April 
14, 2014, http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/signed_copy 
_of_letter_-_section_342.pdf. When the final guidelines were released Rep. 
Waters and Rep. Beatty released a statement expressing disappointment that 
“almost five years after the Dodd–Frank Act was enacted, our federal financial 
services agencies continue to provide lip service to important issues related to the 
diversity and inclusion of women and minorities in the financial services sector.” 
See Leading Democrats Express Concerns with Agency Diversity Standards, U.S. 
HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS. DEMOCRATS (June 18, 2015) 
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docume
ntID=399208 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 230. 12 U.S.C. § 5452 (2012). 
 231. Dodd–Frank Act § 342. 
 232. See 156 Cong. Rec. E1262-02 (daily ed. July 1, 2010) (speech of Hon. 
Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas) (“In addition, the bill requires expanded efforts to 
recruit and to retain minority and women financial services professionals, 
traditionally excluded from the upper ranks of management in most of the federal 
financial services regulatory entities.”). 
 233. See Minorities and Women in Financial Regulatory Reform: The Need for 
Increasing Participation and Opportunities for Qualified Persons and Businesses: 
The Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, and the 
Subcomm. on Hous. & Housing & Cmty. Opportunity, of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 
111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. 
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employment and contracting opportunities available to women and 
minorities.234 Research demonstrates that women represented 
only twenty-seven percent of senior executive managerial positions 
and minorities represented only ten percent of those positions.235  
At the time of the passage of this act, only two of the twenty-
five largest banks in America were headed by minorities and none 
by a woman, and only between four and five percent of all 8,000 or 
so American FDIC-insured banks were controlled by women and 
minorities.236 Though financial institutions had often implemented 
diversity initiatives for fifteen years leading up to the passage of 
this act, management diversity at these institutions had 
“improved, but not changed substantially.”237 Among the concerns 
were that excluding diverse senior-level executives from making 
important decisions, especially in cases of emergency, led to 
excluding or not addressing challenges that minority- and women-
owned businesses faced238 and led to not prioritizing diversity.239 
                                                                                                     
on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg58045/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg58045.pdf [hereinafter The Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform Joint Hearing] (citing data from multiple government financial 
services agencies showing single digit percentages of women and minority 
employees). 
 234. See id. (“In addition, minority- and women-owned businesses frequently 
find themselves excluded from contracting opportunities with financial services 
agencies.”). 
 235. See id. at 4–5 (statement of Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial 
Markets and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office) (noting 
that older statistical categories overstated the representation of women and 
minority representation in upper management); Overall Trends in Mgmt.-Level 
Diversity & Diversity Initiatives, 1993-2008, UNITED STATES GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 10 (May 12, 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d107 
36t.pdf (breaking down representation by minority groups). 
 236. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, at 
18–19 (statement of Carlos Loumiet).  
 237. Id. at 5 (statement of Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial Markets 
and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office). 
 238. See id. at 3–4 (statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on 
Housing & Community Opportunity) (“These offices would ensure that whether 
it is an emergency or if it is simply the day-to-day business of the agency, a senior 
level person charged with diversity will be . . . able to inform the agency about the 
impact of their decisions . . . .”). 
 239. See id. at 29 (statement of Al Green, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. 
Opportunity) (questioning witnesses on the lack of diversity-focused efforts by 
upper management officials). 
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Additionally, lack of diversity at the senior executive level 
minimized access for women and minorities240 and correlated with 
less managerial accountability.241 The executive director of the 
National Association of Securities Professionals, Orim Graves, 
testified at a Congressional hearing before this act was passed 
stating that “it is absolutely vital for the future economic and 
political stability of our nation that the investment decisions are 
made by a more diverse group than the one that created the 
economic crisis today and in the 1980s.”242 
Section 342 requires nine federal financial services agencies 
(the “Agencies”)243 to establish an Office of Minority and Women 
Inclusion (the “Offices”) for the purpose of implementing 
“standards and procedures to ensure, to the maximum extent 
possible, the fair inclusion and utilization of minorities, women, 
and minority-owned and women-owned businesses in all business 
and activities of the agency at all levels, including in procurement, 
insurance, and all types of contracts.”244 These Offices were 
intended to ensure that a diverse senior-level executive would be 
                                                                                                     
 240. See id. at 3 (statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on 
Housing & Community Opportunity) (commenting that minority and women 
owner businesses are often excluded from contracting opportunities).  
 241. See id. at 8 (statement of Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial 
Markets and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office) 
(advocating for measurement of diversity efforts in businesses as a means of 
holding managers accountable for diversity performance); SIFMA, 2007 REPORT 
ON U.S. WORKFORCE DIVERSITY & ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES 5–6 (2007), 
https://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/for_members/hr_and_diversity_resources/fo
r%20members_hr%20and%20diversity%20resources_2007%20diversity%20surv
ey,%20executive%20report.pdf (providing an overview of data collected from 
survey). 
 242. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, at 5 
(testimony of Orim Graves). 
 243. See Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion Created Under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked 
Questions, DEP’T TREASURY (Oct. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ 
Documents/FAQs%20-%20Offices%20of%20Minority%20and%20Women%20Incl 
usion%20-%20Oct%202010%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he Departmental Offices of the 
Department of Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency . . . the Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Reserve Board, the 
National Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
and . . . Consumer Finance Protection Bureau . . . .”). 
 244. 156 Congress. Rec. § 5902, 5908 (July 15, 2010). 
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in the room for daily business decisions as well as decisions in an 
emergency situation who could “inform the [A]gency about the 
impact of their decisions on minority- and women-owned 
businesses.”245 These Offices were also intended to be responsible 
for increasing diversity within the Agencies246 by developing and 
implementing workforce diversity standards.247 The Offices would 
be in charge of “all matters of its agency related to diversity in 
management, employment, and business activities.”248 In short, 
these Offices were meant to ensure that diverse members sit at the 
decision-making table to protect the interests of women and 
minorities,249 and that “capable, competent, and qualified” women 
and minorities had equal opportunity to be at the top.250 
B. Diversity Standards for Regulated Entities 
In effectuating the broad goals of the Section 342, each Agency 
must appoint a director (the “Directors”) to oversee the 
                                                                                                     
 245. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, at 4 
(statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty). 
 246. See id. at 3–4 (reiterating the importance of institutionalizing access for 
women and minority groups through these offices). 
 247. See, Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion Created Under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked 
Questions, DEP’T TREASURY (Oct. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
wsr/Documents/FAQs%20-%20Offices%20of%20Minority%20and%20Women%20 
Inclusion%20-%20Oct%202010%20FINAL.pdf (outlining other key duties of each 
Office of Minority and Women Inclusion). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Joint Hearing, supra note 233, 
at 8 (statement of Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. 
Opportunity) (“[S]o there is someone who is sitting at the table who can say . . . do 
you not remember that we just had a subprime meltdown where minority 
communities were targeted . . . .”). 
 250. See id. at 10 (statement of Al Green, Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. 
Opportunity); About the Office of Minority & Women Inclusion, SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (June 11, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/omwi/about-omwi (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2016) (stating the SEC’s OMWI “is currently engaged in forming strategic 
collaborations and conducting outreach to diverse professional associations, 
organizations, and institutions” and “is proactively increasing awareness of the 
SEC’s contracting needs by conducting outreach and providing technical 
assistance to expand opportunities to minority-owned and women-owned 
businesses”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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development of standards which broadly encompass: (A) “[an] 
equal employment opportunity and the racial, ethnic, and gender 
diversity of the workforce and senior management of the agency; 
(B) increased participation of minority-owned and women-owned 
business in the programs and contracts of the agency[;] . . . and 
(C) assessing the diversity policies and practices of entities 
regulated by the agency.”251 Thus, in addition to developing 
standards intended to enhance diversity within their respective 
Agencies, Directors must also develop standards to assess the 
diversity policies of their regulated entities.252 This section 
represents a broad commitment to enhanced diversity in the 
American economy. Arguably, with respect to the SEC for example, 
the agency must develop uniform standards for assessing the 
diversity policies of the thousands of public companies for which it 
regulates.253 Some have estimated that the SEC regulates over 
“12,000 public companies, 5,500 broker-dealer firms, 670,000 
stockbrokers, 4,600 mutual funds and 11,000-plus registered 
investment advisers.”254 
1. Joint Standards 
In an effort to promote consistency, six of the nine Agencies 
adopted joint proposed standards on October 25, 2013, which were 
to be used by the Agencies’ regulated entities to assess the 
effectiveness of their respective diversity policies.255 On June 10, 
                                                                                                     
 251. 15 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 252. See id. at 5452(d) (stating the extent of the section’s applicability to 
contracts of an agency). 
 253. Cf. id. at 5452(b)(3) (“Each Director shall advise the agency 
administrator of the impact of the policies and regulations of the agency on 
minority-owned and women-owned businesses.”). 
 254. Quentin Fottrell, 10 Things the SEC Won't Tell You, MARKETWATCH 
(Oct. 30, 2011, 7:02 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-the-sec-
wont-tell-you-1320000352729 (last updated Nov. 29, 2012) (last visited Dec. 13, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 255. See Proposed Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint 
Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated 
by the Agencies and Request for Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,052 (proposed 
Oct. 25, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_final-diversity-
standards-statement.pdf (giving background on the development of joint 
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2015, the Agencies then adopted a final interagency policy 
statement, which finalized these joint diversity standards (Joint 
Standards).256 These Joint Standards address the following 
categories of activities with respect to such regulated entities: 
(1) organizational commitment to diversity and inclusion; 
(2) workforce profile and employment practices; (3) procurement 
and business practices and supplier diversity; and (4) practices to 
promote transparency of organizational diversity and inclusion.257 
Under each of these categories, the Agencies then provide specific 
standards that regulated entities can evaluate in assessing the 
suitability of their diversity policies.258 The Agencies further 
specify that each of these standards could be tailored to the unique 
characteristics of each regulated entity such as size, number of 
employees, and total assets under management.259  
Overall, these Joint Standards imply that diversity 
assessments should extend beyond the boardroom to include senior 
management, employees, and contractual relationships with 
suppliers and other possible sub-contractors.260 With respect to 
supplier diversity for example, the Agencies suggest that firms 
attempt to provide “a fair opportunity for minority-and women-
owned business to compete for procurement of business goods and 
services . . . .”261 With regard to enhancing workforce diversity, the 
Agencies suggest that regulated entities recruit from institutions 
that serve large female or minority populations, such as 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities.262  
                                                                                                     
standards and seeking comment on their perceived effectiveness). 
 256. Joint Guidelines, supra note 44. 
 257. See 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,055–56 (providing summaries of the 
applicability of each category of standards). 
 258. See id. (“The Entity provides regular progress reports to the board and/or 
senior management.”). 
 259. See id. at 64,055 (“For example . . . governance structure, 
revenues, . . . contract volume, geographic location, and community 
characteristics . . . .”). 
 260. See id. (setting out standards that apply to both low-level employees and 
upper management).  
 261. 80 Fed. Reg. 33017. 
 262. Cf. OFFICE OF MINORITY AND WOMEN INCLUSION, FDIC, 2012 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 12 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/about/diversity/rtc_3_28_13.pdf (“[T]he 
FDIC’s Corporate Recruitment Program continued in 2012 to maintain ongoing 
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However, this Article primarily evaluates the implementation 
of diversity standards related to management, which is the first 
category identified by the Agencies. Senior management would 
likely include the board members of a regulated entity, as well as 
its senior officers such as the CEO and CFO, for example. With 
respect to this first category, the Agencies suggest that regulated 
entities implement the following standard (among others): “[t]he 
entity takes proactive steps to promote a diverse pool of 
candidates, including women and minorities, in its hiring, 
recruiting, retention, and promotion, as well as in its selection of 
board members, senior management, and other senior leadership 
positions.”263 This standard is likely designed to ensure that a 
diverse pool of candidates is considered for the leadership roles of 
regulated entities. 
The Joint Standards also provide that the term “diversity” 
specifically encompasses minorities and women, with “minorities” 
including “Black Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic 
Americans, and Asian Americans.”264 However, the Joint 
Standards permit regulated entities to use a more expansive 
definition.265 An expanded definition of diversity could possibly 
include “individuals with disabilities, veterans, and LGBT 
individuals.”266  
2. Voluntariness  
In adopting these Joint Standards, the Agencies clarified that 
assessing the diversity policies of regulated entities would not 
entail a traditional examination or supervision process.267 More 
                                                                                                     
relationships with a wide range of colleges and universities to target a diverse 
talent pool for the CEP. These colleges and universities included 110 institutions 
designated as either minority-serving institutions or tribal colleges.”). 
 263. 78 Fed. Reg. 64052, 64055. 
 264. 80 Fed. Reg. 33017. 
 265. See id. (“This language is intended to be sufficiently flexible to 
encompass other groups . . .”). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,054 (noting that many different types of 
assessments allow for both the Agencies and the public to understand diversity 
policies). 
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specifically, the Agencies seemingly will not employ their 
enforcement powers to ensure that their regulated entities are in 
compliance with the statute. Regulated entities are instead 
instructed to implement a self-assessment of their diversity 
policies, using the guidance provided under the Joint Standards.268 
While compliance with these Joint Standards is highly encouraged 
by the Agencies, it is still purely voluntary. Regulated entities will 
seemingly not face enforcement proceedings for failing to integrate 
these Joint Standards within their underlying policies and 
practices.269 Disclosure of such compliance (or non-compliance) has 
also been deemed voluntary by the Agencies.270 While the Joint 
Standards strongly encourage transparency—through the annual 
publication of diversity policies on company websites, for 
example—the Joint Standards clarified that such disclosure, both 
to the general public and to their respective Agencies, is completely 
voluntary.271  
Many commenters appreciated the Agencies’ decision to 
permit self-assessments. One comment letter published by several 
banking associations stated that “[r]egulated entities themselves 
are in the best position to assess their own diversity policies and 
practices. Many larger regulated entities already have well 
considered diversity policies and a track record of implementing, 
applying and developing those policies in the real world.”272 In 
contrast, other commenters expressed concerns that permitting 
                                                                                                     
 268. See id. (suggesting that the use of self-assessment promotes 
transparency and awareness within the entities). 
 269. See 80 Fed. Reg. 33,017 (“[T]he Agencies have added the following 
language: ‘This document is a general statement of policy . . . . It does not create 
new legal obligations.’”). 
 270. See 80 Fed. Reg. 33,020 (recounting that other commenters who claim 
that voluntary disclosure would conflict with congressional intent). 
 271. See 78 Fed. Reg. 64,052, 64,056 (stating that Agencies will use the 
disclosed information as resource in carrying out diversity efforts). 
 272.  Comment Letter Relating to Proposed Interagency Policy Statement 
Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices 
of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment from the 
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self-assessment would significantly detract from the stated goals 
of the act.273  
SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar strongly objected that in 
permitting self-assessments, the Agencies ignored the vast 
majority of comment letters received from “[m]embers of Congress, 
civil rights organizations, community-based organizations, 
professional associations, consumer advocacy groups, banking 
organizations, employer associations, financial services trade 
organizations, banks, credit unions, and individuals.”274 According 
to Commissioner Aguilar, these commenters persuasively argued 
that “voluntary self-assessments are ineffective because, without 
specific obligations and requirements, few regulated entities will 
conduct assessments or share assessment information.”275 If this 
is true, then Section 342 will have a minimal impact on actually 
increasing diversity in the financial sector. Americans for 
Financial Reform further suggested that Agency Offices should 
“devote staff and develop methodologies to conduct assessments of 
the entities that they regulate.”276 
With respect to the voluntary disclosure of such diversity 
policies, commentators similarly expressed concerns regarding the 
extent to which this would hold regulated entities sufficiently 
accountable. Professor Cheryl Nichols suggests that Congress 
intended that the disclosure of diversity policies by regulated 
                                                                                                     
 273. See Leading Democrats Express Concerns with Agency Diversity 
Standards, U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FIN. SERVS. DEMOCRATS (June 18, 2015), 
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docume
ntID=399208 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (“[T]hese final rules . . . have the 
potential to undermine the meaningful progress Dodd–Frank made toward a 
more diverse financial sector.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 274. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting 
Statement on the Final Interagency Policy Statement: Failing to Advance 
Diversity and Inclusion (June 9, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
statement/dissent-interagency-policy-statement-diversity.html (last visited Dec. 
13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 275. Id. 
 276. Comment Letter Relating to Proposed Interagency Policy Statement 
Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices 
of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment from the 
Americans for Financial Reform, 3 (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ncua.gov/Legal/ 
CommentLetters/CLExtension20140207AFR.pdf. 
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entities be mandatory.277 Nichols concludes that mandatory 
disclosure is necessary as it would provide the data needed to 
ascertain the efficacy of the statute.278  
VI. Safety & Soundness and Diversifying to Mitigate Risk 
As Part IV explained, Congress intended for Section 342 to 
reach businesses in the financial services sector whether organized 
as corporations that have distributed shares in public securities 
markets or limited liability companies or partnerships engaged in 
the shadow banking market intermediating credit. The Joint 
Standards encompass the weak standards that federal regulatory 
agencies have adopted to date. Regulators have power to reduce 
excessive risk taking and broad powers to order remedies 
concerning risk-taking innovation.279 Financial regulators hold 
broad power to determine legal violations in the financial sector.280 
This Article suggests that financial regulators exercise these 
powers to further the full diversification of the financial sector in 
appropriate circumstances.281 We will begin our assessment of the 
regulatory powers the federal financial regulators wield in the 
banking industry and then discuss the even broader powers the 
SEC holds to facilitate diversity. 
                                                                                                     
 277. See Comment Letter Relating to Proposed Interagency Policy Statement 
Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices 
of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment from Cheryl 
Nichols 2 (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-13/s70813-21.pdf 
(“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily considered mandatory . . . .”). 
 278. See id. (arguing that such data will be essential to determine whether 
more regulation is needed).  
 279. See generally MARY RAMIREZ & STEVEN RAMIREZ, THE CORPORATE DEATH 
PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 1–28 (2017) 
(analyzing the ability of politically and economically high-powered figured to 
commit financial crimes with no regulatory or criminal repercussions). 
 280. See id. (noting that, despite overwhelming proof of fraud during the 2008 
financial crisis, the government failed to utilize its law enforcement tools). 
 281. We fully comprehend the complex political realities facing the financial 
regulators. The revolving door problem, lobby largesse, campaign contributions, 
and overlapping social networks are all beyond the scope of this Article. Id. 
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A. The Federal Banking Regulators 
The starting point for understanding the powers of the federal 
bank regulators282 is the concept of safe and sound banking 
practices: the banking regulators assure the safety and soundness 
of banks by sanctioning unsafe and unsound banking practices 
uncovered, inter alia, during annual examinations.283 Since 1933, 
this bedrock principle of banking regulation has acted as the 
trigger of the federal banking regulators vast enforcement 
                                                                                                     
 282. Only the OCC, the FDIC, and the Fed share enforcement powers as 
direct regulators of banks and similar depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1813 
(q), (z) (2012). The NCUA holds similar power with respect to federal credit 
unions. 12 U.S.C. § 1786 (2012). The Fed also exercises enforcement power 
against bank holding companies and non-bank subsidiaries under Section 1818. 
12 U.S.C. § 1818 (b)(3) (2012). As used in this Article, the term “federal bank 
regulators” refers to these agencies. These regulators typical conduct annual bank 
examinations and evaluate the safety and soundness of each regulated bank. 
Julie Andersen Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution 
Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1107 
(2015) 
During an examination, regulators . . . review the institution’s policies, 
procedures, and records. Examiners then rate the institution using the 
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System. Under the System, 
regulators evaluate the safety and soundness of institutions using the 
“CAMEL” or “CAMELS” factors: capital, assets, management, 
earnings, liquidity, and susceptibility to market risk. Regulators rate 
each item on a 1 to 5 scale, with a 1 rating being the highest possible 
score.” Examiners also award each institution a composite rating 
meant to assess the overall condition of the institution. The composite 
score is not simply an average of the component ratings. Rather, in 
issuing a composite rating the regulator considers the components and 
“may incorporate any factor that bears significantly on the 
[institution's] overall condition.” 
Id. We argue herein that the degree of cultural diversity within a financial 
institution should be one factor that regulators consider in addressing the safety 
and soundness of a financial institution. 
 283. Principles of safety and soundness form the foundation of federal bank 
regulation. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: 
Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 144, 165, 178 (1995) (“Unsafe or unsound banking practices long have 
served as a trigger for . . . liability under every important formal enforcement 
provision in the federal banking laws.”). Under these provisions bank regulators 
can: issue cease and desist orders, including monetary damages; remove directors 
and officers from office; prohibit firms from participation in the banking industry; 
and impose fines of up to one million dollars per day. Id. 
DIVERSIFYING TO MITIGATE RISK 1853 
powers.284 Although mentioned in many key banking law statutes, 
at the federal level, the term “unsafe and unsound banking 
practice”285 has been defined primarily through regulatory 
statements and actions.286 Most recently, the OCC defined the 
term in an enforcement action as “any action, or lack of action, 
which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent 
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would 
be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its 
shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance 
funds.”287 The federal banking regulators rely on this definition 
when exercising the broad enforcement powers that Congress gave 
them.288 Notably, none of those statutes requires more.289 
Thus, under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, the bank regulators may 
exercise broad powers to deal with any bank that engages in unsafe 
and unsound banking practices.290 The FDIC, for example, can 
                                                                                                     
 284. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818, 1844 (2012) (specifying the enforcement 
tools and powers of the NCUA, the OCC, the FDIC, and the Fed).  
 285. In re Adams, No. AA-EC-11-50, 2014 WL 8735096, at *2 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
 286. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the Federal Deposit Insurance Act contains 
no definition of the term “unsafe or unsound practice” and asserting John E. 
Horne’s definition is the primary definition used in enforcement actions). 
 287. Id. at *2–3 (citing Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966: 
Hearings on S. 3158 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 49 (1966) (statement of John E. Horne, Chairman of the Fed. Home Loan 
Bank Bd.)); see also Nw. Nat’l Bank v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 917 F.2d 1111, 
1115 (8th Cir. 1990) (defining the term “unsafe or unsound business practice” as 
“conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking operations which 
might result in abnormal risk or loss to a banking institution or shareholder”) 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th 
Cir. 1978)). 
 288. See id. at *3 (“The OCC and the other Federal banking agencies 
consistently have relied on this definition in bringing enforcement cases in the 
decades since [Horne’s description of the term].”); see also id. (“[A] minority of 
circuits apply the [Horne] definition with a restrictive gloss that serves to narrow 
the circumstances under which enforcement actions may be taken.”) (citing Gulf 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 
1981) (referring to an additional requirement that the practice threaten the 
financial stability of the bank)).  
 289. Professor Schooner suggests that the unsafe and unsound practice must 
also involve “at least a potential risk to the bank’s solvency.” Schooner, supra note 
283, at 202.  
 290. The plain meaning of the statute fails to require any threat to the 
financial stability of the bank. See, e.g., In re Adams, 2014 WL 8735096, at *3–4 
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terminate the deposit insurance of any insured depository 
institution for “engaging in any unsafe and unsound practices” or 
operating in an “unsafe and unsound condition.”291 In addition, all 
federal bank regulators can issue cease and desist orders to any 
federally regulated bank to stop any “unsafe or unsound 
practice.”292 The agencies can remove any officer or director of a 
regulated entity if it finds that any officer or director “participated 
in any unsafe or unsound practice . . . .”293 The federal banking 
regulators can also force an insured bank into conservatorship or 
receivership for unsafe or unsound practices, or for operating in an 
unsafe or unsound condition.294 Finally, the agencies can seek civil 
penalties for unsafe and unsound practices of up to one million 
dollars per day.295 
                                                                                                     
(describing the range of possible remedies enforcement staff may take against 
banks). It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the decisions that narrow the 
regulatory reach of the enforcement power of the federal bank regulators with the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. See generally 
Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.). Section 1831o of title 12 of the United States Code requires the federal 
banking regulators to take “prompt corrective action” even against well-
capitalized depository institutions when the regulators find unsafe or unsound 
practices. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(2) (2012) (requiring each appropriate federal 
banking agency take “prompt corrective action” to resolve problems). “With the 
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
Congress directed the federal banking agencies to exercise their enforcement 
muscle long before an institution fails or faces imminent threat of failure.” 
Schooner, supra note 283, at 178. This forces the regulators to assume a more 
formal and proactive role with regard to supervision of operating institutions. Id.  
 291. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (a)(2) (2012). 
 292. See id. § 1818(b) (describing the cease and desist proceeding). 
 293. See id. § 1818(e)(1)(A)(ii) (allowing for the removal of officers of a 
regulated entity when the entity is found to have “engaged or participated in any 
unsafe or unsound practice in connection with any insured depository institution 
or business institution”). Any such prohibition amounts to an industry-wide 
prohibition. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7) (2012) (requiring an “industrywide 
prohibition” on the hiring of removed or suspended individuals). Thus, this power 
can operate to terminate careers. See id. at § 1818(g) (providing authority for 
suspension, removal, and prohibition of participation orders for certain criminal 
offenses).  
 294. See id. § 1821(c)(5) (describing the grounds for appointing a conservator 
or receiver). 
 295. See id. § 1833(b)(2) (allowing an agency to assess civil penalties for 
continuing violations in an amount “[not to] exceed the lesser of $1,000,000 per 
day or $5,000,000”). 
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In the course of enforcing these broad powers to assure safe 
and sound banking, the banking regulators can restrict the growth 
of an institution, place limitations on the activities of an 
institution, or, importantly, “employ qualified officers or 
employees” subject to the approval of the banking regulators.296 
Indeed, Congress specified that the federal banking regulators 
may “take such other actions as the banking agency determines to 
be appropriate.”297 Further, Congress statutorily recognized that 
the federal banking regulators may come to negotiated agreements 
with the banks they supervise, and violation of such agreements 
themselves trigger the above-referenced enforcement powers.298 
Finally, the federal banking regulators may deem a bank to be 
engaged in an unsafe and unsound banking practice if a bank 
receives an unsatisfactory rating in an examination report for 
asset quality, management, earnings, or liquidity.299  
Congress gave the federal banking regulators additional 
regulatory power over virtually all core facets of banks.300 Under 
12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1, the federal banking regulators must 
promulgate standards for safe and sound internal controls, loan 
documentation and underwriting, interest rate risk, asset growth, 
compensation, and other managerial standards.301 If any bank 
fails to meet such standards, then the federal banking regulator 
may seek a remedial plan, acceptable to the regulator.302 If such a 
plan is not forthcoming, the relevant federal banking regulator 
                                                                                                     
 296. See id. § 1818(b)(6)(A)–(F) (listing the affirmative actions banking 
regulators may take to correct conditions resulting from violations or practices). 
 297. Id. § 1818(b)(6)(F). 
 298. See id. § 1818(a)(2)(iii), (b)(1) & (e)(1)(A)(i)(III)–(IV) (establishing a 
violation of a written agreement as cause for exercise of enforcement power). 
 299. See id. § 1818(b)(8) (providing that bank regulators may deem an 
institution to be “engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice” the institution is 
found to have unsatisfactory asset quality, management, earnings, or liquidity). 
 300. See id. § 1831p-1(a)(1)–(2) (listing each internal bank practice for which 
bank regulators may prescribe standards). 
 301. See id. § 1831p-1(a) (enumerating the operational and managerial 
standards federal banking agencies must enforce). 
 302. See id. § 1831p-1(e)(1)(A)(i) (explaining how if the failure to meet safety 
and soundness standards involves a violation of a regulation the federal banking 
regulator “shall” seek a corrective plan).  
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may order the bank to take “any other action”303 necessary for the 
prompt correction of the deficiency.304 
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Fed) holds 
additional powers with respect to bank holding companies. 
Specifically, under 12 U.S.C. § 1844, the Fed may order the 
termination of any activity or the divestiture of any subsidiary 
constituting a “serious risk” to the “financial safety soundness and 
stability” of the bank holding company or subsidiary bank.305 The 
bank holding company may either terminate the activity that is 
the source of the risk, terminate its ownership of the non-bank 
subsidiary where the risk resides, or terminate ownership of its 
bank subsidiary.306 Termination of ownership may be 
accomplished through sale or distribution of shares to 
shareholders of the bank holding company.307 
Of course, the federal banking regulators need not exercise 
these powers in order to impose reforms if enforcement targets 
agree to proposed governance reforms. For example, the Fed 
recently sanctioned State Street Bank (a state-chartered member 
bank of the Federal Reserve System) and its parent company State 
Street Corporation (a bank holding company).308 The Fed 
                                                                                                     
 303. Id. § 1831p-1(e)(2)(B)(iv). 
 304. Section 1831o requires that “[e]ach appropriate Federal banking agency 
and the Corporation (acting in the Corporation’s capacity as the insurer of 
depository institutions under this chapter) shall carry out the purpose of this 
section by taking prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of insured 
depository institutions.” 12 U.S.C. § 1831o. 
 305. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1) (allowing the Fed, “whenever it has reasonable 
cause to believe that the continuation by a bank holding company of any 
activity . . . constitutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or 
stability of a bank holding company subsidiary bank,” to terminate the activities). 
 306. See id. § 1844(e)(1)(A)–(B) (reviewing the powers of the Fed to terminate 
activities, ownership, and control of nonbank subsidiaries). 
 307. See id. (explaining that the Fed may order the termination of ownership 
which may occur “by sale or by distribution of the shares of the subsidiary to the 
shareholders of the bank holding company”). 
 308. See Written Agreement by and among, State Street Corporation, Boston, 
Massachusetts, State Street Bank and Trust, Boston, Massachusetts, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, and Massachusetts Division of Banks, before the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, May 28, 2015, https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20150601a1.pdf (describing the technicalities 
of the alleged noncompliance). 
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enforcement action culminated in an agreement that required 
State Street Corporation to, among other things: (1) submit a 
written plan to strengthen the board’s oversight of compliance and 
risk management acceptable to the regulators with respect to 
money laundering and compliance with the U.S. Treasury Office of 
Foreign Asset Control; (2) address funding for personnel, systems, 
and other resources as needed to achieve appropriate risk 
management and compliance; (3) take measures to improve the 
information reported to the board of directors with respect to such 
compliance; (4) ensure greater senior management participation in 
such compliance efforts; and (5) provide for enhanced monitoring 
and testing of compliance with respect to such regulatory 
mandates.309 State Street Bank also agreed to such enhanced 
measures to achieve compliance with regulations.310 Additionally, 
the bank agreed to hire an independent third party to conduct a 
compliance review.311 Essentially, “State Street Corp. was ordered 
by regulators to revamp its compliance programs after deficiencies 
were found related to internal controls, customer due-diligence 
procedures and transaction monitoring.”312 This agreed method of 
resolving regulatory deficiencies illustrates well the wide-ranging 
powers of the federal banking regulators to impose reforms in 
internal governance at regulated entities.313 
                                                                                                     
 309. See id. at 1–3 (describing the mandated requirements for board oversight 
and a compliance risk management program). 
 310. See id. 1–2 (detailing the bank’s commitment to bring operations into 
compliance with multiple different regulations). 
 311. See id. at 7 (“Within 30 days of this Agreement, the Bank shall engage 
an independent third party, acceptable to the Supervisors, to conduct a review of 
account and transaction activity . . . .”).  
 312. Chelsey Dulaney & Ryan Tracy, State Street Ordered to Improve 
Compliance Program, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/state-street-ordered-to-improve-compliance-program-1433174224 (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 313. In another such example, the OCC fined HSBC $500 million and ordered 
it “to take comprehensive corrective actions to improve its BSA compliance 
program.” OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., DEP’T TREASURY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). On the same date, the OCC 
“issued a separate cease and desist order to address deficiencies in the bank's 
enterprise-wide compliance program.” Id. HSBC consented to both orders. Id. 
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The banking regulators also have the power to issue 
interpretive guidance to regulated entities. The FDIC—holding 
broad regulatory power due to its role as deposit insurer—issued 
such guidance regarding its expectations of officers and directors 
of FDIC insured banks.314 The FDIC expects directors to maintain 
“competent management,” to “establish[] business strategies and 
policies,” and to take actions to assure legal compliance and 
compliance with principles of safety and soundness.315 Officers are 
“responsible for compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and 
principles of safety and soundness.”316 Moreover, the FDIC expects 
managers “to respond promptly to supervisory criticism.”317 “When 
an institution becomes troubled, it is especially important that it 
have the benefit of the advice and direction of people whose 
                                                                                                     
 314.  The FDIC statement regarding fiduciary duties of officers and directors 
provides: 
The duty of care requires directors and officers to act as prudent and 
diligent business persons in conducting the affairs of the bank. This 
means that directors are responsible for selecting, monitoring, and 
evaluating competent management; establishing business strategies 
and policies; monitoring and assessing the progress of business 
operations; establishing and monitoring adherence to policies and 
procedures required by statute, regulation, and principles of safety and 
soundness; and for making business decisions on the basis of fully 
informed and meaningful deliberation. Officers are responsible for 
running the day to day operations of the institution in compliance with 
applicable laws, rules, regulations and the principles of safety and 
soundness. This responsibility includes implementing appropriate 
policies and business objectives. Directors must require and 
management must provide the directors with timely and ample 
information to discharge board responsibilities. Directors also are 
responsible for requiring management to respond promptly to 
supervisory criticism. Open and honest communication between the 
board and management of the bank and the regulators is extremely 
important. 
New FDIC Guidelines Issued to Clarify the Responsibilities of Bank Directors and 
Officers, FDIC FIL-87-92 (Dec. 17, 1992), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/ 
rules/5000-3300.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) [hereinafter FDIC Guidelines] 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also OCC, THE DIRECTOR’S 
BOOK 10–17, 19–47 (2010), http://www.occ.gov /publications/publications-by-
type/other-publications-reports/The-Directors-Book.pdf (articulating similar 
standards applicable to federally chartered depository institutions). 
 315. FDIC Guidelines, supra note 314. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
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experience and talents enable them to exercise sound and prudent 
judgment.”318 The FDIC speaks with particular authority in this 
area because it is the sole federal regulator operating as a receiver 
for insolvent depository institutions319 and has a legal mandate to 
pursue any fiduciary duty claims against former bank directors 
and officers.320 In this connection, the FDIC emphasizes that in 
considering whether to pursue such claims it will assess whether 
managers complied with laws, regulations, and supervisory 
agreements or heeded regulator warnings.321 
The upshot of all of this is that the federal banking regulators 
have broad power to address and remedy all issues relating to safe 
and sound banking practices. Anytime an insured depository 
institution engages in any unsafe or unsound practice, or is 
operating in an unsafe and unsound condition, the federal banking 
regulators can impose any conditions necessary to stem the risks 
of such practice as part of their normal enforcement powers and 
processes.322 
Nothing in Section 342 of the Dodd–Frank Act limits the 
regulators’ power to address and remedy issues. Section 342 limits 
the power to impose cultural diversity in only one way: “[N]othing 
in [Section 342(b)] may be construed to mandate any requirement 
on or otherwise affect the lending policies and practices of any 
                                                                                                     
 318. Id. 
 319. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (“The Corporation shall be 
appointed receiver, and shall accept such appointment, whenever a receiver is 
appointed for the purpose of liquidation or winding up the affairs of an insured 
Federal depositor institution . . . .”).  
 320. See id. § 1821(k)(1)–(3) (enumerating the liabilities of bank directors and 
officers). 
 321. See FDIC Guidelines, supra note 314 (stating that claims pursued often 
involve “[c]ases where a director or officer was responsible for []failure . . . to 
adhere to applicable laws and regulations” and that claims against “outside 
directors either involve insider abuse or situations where the directors failed to 
heed warnings . . . that there was a significant problem”). Between 1985 and 
1992, the FDIC pursued claims against officers and directors about twenty-four 
percent of the time a bank failed. Id. 
 322. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(F) (including the power to order the bank 
to “take such other actions as the banking agency determines to be appropriate” 
within the power to issue a cease and desist order); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
(b)(1) & (e)(1)(A)(i)(III)–(IV) (explaining that federal banking regulators always 
retain the power to come to negotiated agreements with banks found to engage in 
unsafe or unsound practices). 
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regulated entity, or to require any specific action based on the 
findings of the assessment.”323 This sole limitation does not impact 
the regulators’ preexisting power to address unsafe and unsound 
banking practices and conditions, even if such violations also 
implicate weak diversity policies and practices as part of the 
unsafe or unsound banking practice and conditions.324 The 
regulators also traditionally exercised their remedial power 
broadly and it would defy the intent of the political branches to 
limit the reach of the federal regulators to address diversity in the 
financial sector under the Dodd–Frank Act; they manifestly held 
the opposite intent.325 The SEC has similarly used its enforcement 
powers to plumb the depths of internal governance at regulated 
entities, as the next section of this Article will show. 
B. The SEC and the Securities Industry 
The SEC’s main concern is legal compliance and regulatory 
risk.326 For example, 15 U.S.C. § 78o gives the SEC power to revoke 
                                                                                                     
 323. Dodd–Frank Act § 342(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(4) (2012). 
 324. It is a fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that statutes 
should be construed in harmony with preexisting statutes and the implied repeals 
or limitations of pre-existing statutes are disfavored. See FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (explaining that courts should 
interpret the statutes as a “symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme” and 
“fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole”); United States v. Spinelle, 41 
F.3d 1056, 1059 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 
(1974)); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“In the absence of some 
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification 
for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are 
irreconcilable.” (citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456–57 
(1945))). Indeed, “when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of 
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to 
regard each as effective.” Id. at 551. See also Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels 
Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Repeals by implication are 
not favored in the law and are permitted only when the earlier and later statutes 
are irreconcilable.” (citing United States v. Spinelle, 41 F.3d 1056, 1059 (6th Cir. 
1994))). 
 325. See supra note 229 (detailing the legislative intent behind the Dodd–
Frank Act). 
 326.  See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 126 
(“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: require that investors 
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being 
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the registration of broker-dealers, which is tantamount to the 
corporate death penalty as a broker-dealer cannot operate without 
an effective registration with the SEC.327 For our purposes, the key 
provision authorizing such revocation is Section 78o(b)(4), which 
provides that suspension or revocation is authorized if either the 
broker-dealer (or any person associated with the broker-dealer): 
(1) commits any fraud-based crime; (2) is found civilly responsible 
for fraud-related offenses; (3) is found to have willfully violated any 
part of the federal securities laws or regulations thereunder; or, (4) 
willfully aids and abets such violation.328 Of course, like the 
banking regulators, the SEC need not impose the corporate death 
penalty.329 The statute specifies that the SEC may impose any 
“limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of . . . [the] 
broker or dealer.”330 Also, like the federal banking regulators, the 
SEC has the power to permanently bar individuals found to have 
violated the federal securities laws from the securities industry.331 
The SEC illustrated this point with its record-setting 
settlement with Goldman, Sachs & Co. relating to its alleged 
fraudulent sale of securities-related subprime mortgages.332 Not 
                                                                                                     
offered for public sale; and prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud 
in the sale of securities.”). 
 327. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to place 
restrictions on a broker’s registration). 
 328. See id. § 78o(b)(4)(A)–(H) (enumerating the situations under which the 
SEC has the authority to suspend or revoke a broker’s registration). 
 329. See id. § 78o(b)(4) (providing the SEC options to censure, place 
limitations on, suspend, or revoke broker registrations). There is an additional 
layer of regulation in the securities industry. Specifically, all broker-dealers must 
maintain membership in a self-regulatory organization (SRO) such as the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). See id. at § 78o(b)(8) (requiring broker-dealers to 
register pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3—with a self-regulatory organization—
before the broker-dealer may affect any transaction). 
 330. Id. § 78o(b)(4). 
 331. See id. § 78o(b)(6) (“[T]he Commission, by order, shall censure, place 
limitations on the activities of such person, or suspend for a period not exceeding 
12 months, or bar any such person . . . .”). 
 332. See Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm (last updated July 15, 2010) 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“Half a billion dollars is the largest penalty ever 
assessed against a financial services firm in the history of the SEC . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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only did Goldman pay $550 million to settle the claims of the SEC, 
it also acknowledged that material misrepresentations occurred in 
connection with the marketing of such securities and agreed to 
internal governance reforms.333 More specifically, it agreed to:  
[R]emedial action . . . in its review and approval of offerings of 
certain mortgage securities. This includes the role and 
responsibilities of internal legal counsel, compliance personnel, 
and outside counsel in the review of written marketing 
materials for such offerings. The settlement also requires 
additional education and training of Goldman employees in this 
area of the firm’s business.334 
This settlement thus demonstrates again the power of the federal 
financial regulators over the internal governance of firms they 
regulate.335 
The SEC regulates many entities beyond just broker-dealers. 
Indeed, the Joint Guidelines identify the SEC as the agency with 
the greatest number of regulated entities subject to the 
guidelines.336 The regulated entities subject to the Joint Guidelines 
and SEC regulation include: investment advisers, investment 
companies, self-regulatory organizations (such as the NYSE), 
                                                                                                     
 333. See id. (“In agreeing to the SEC’s largest-ever penalty paid by a Wall 
Street firm, Goldman also acknowledged that its marketing materials for the 
subprime product contained incomplete information.”). 
 334. Id. 
 335. More recently, the SEC settled charges with Merrill Lynch regarding its 
record keeping obligations for $11 million. See Merrill Lynch Admits Using 
Inaccurate Data for Short Sale Orders, Agrees to $11 Million Settlement, SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/ 2015-105.html (last 
updated June 1, 2015) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (detailing a SEC action against 
Merrill Lynch) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Merrill also 
agreed to hire an independent consultant to assist in future record keeping 
obligations. Id. Merrill Lynch previously settled similar record keeping charges 
for $131 million involving claims that it had misled investors with respect to 
securities offerings. See SEC Charges Merrill Lynch with Misleading Investors in 
CDOs, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press 
Release/1370540492377 (last updated Dec. 12, 2013) (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) 
(detailing charged filed by the SEC against Merrill Lynch regarding an alleged 
failure to provide information to investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 336. See Joint Guidelines, supra note 44, at 33021 (explaining how the SEC 
estimated that 1,250 of its regulated entities would respond to a survey regarding 
diversity policies, which is 500 more respondents than the next closest agency). 
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rating agencies, and certain institutions involved in derivatives 
markets.337 The SEC regulatory scheme with respect to each of 
these different types of financial institutions differs in important 
ways.338 However, there are many common themes: each of these 
types of entities must register with the SEC; the SEC holds the 
power to revoke such registrations for a variety of reasons, 
including legal and regulatory violations; and the SEC conducts 
periodic examinations of each type of regulated entity.339 
Invariably, the SEC may also take action short of revoking 
registrations, which operates as a corporate death penalty.340 
An example of the SEC’s power to influence regulated entities 
is in its enforcement action against an investment company, 
Putnam Investment Management LLC. In late 2003, SEC settled 
claims against Putnam relating to alleged violations of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940341 and the Investment Company 
Act of 1940.342 The Commission found that Putnam committed 
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in the 
form of mutual fund shares.343 Putnam failed to disclose self-
                                                                                                     
 337. See id. at 33020 n.6 (listing the primary federal financial regulator for 
various institutions identified in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)). 
 338. See What We Do, supra note 127 (describing the manner in which various 
industries are regulated). 
 339. See id. (“The Act also identified and prohibits certain types of conduct in 
the markets and provides the Commission with disciplinary powers over 
regulated entities and persons associated with them.”).  
 340. An example of this power is 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b)(4), discussed above. 
 341. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000). The Court 
termed that the intent of the Investment Advisers Act—like the federal securities 
laws in general—“was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business 
ethics in the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The Act accomplished this through broad anti-fraud 
provisions that supported private claims and registration of investment advisers. 
See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 1051, 1081–82 (2011). 
 342. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000). 
 343. See In re Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act, S.E.C. 
Release No. 2192, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11317, 2003 WL 
22683975, at *6 (Nov. 13, 2003) (“[W]hile acting as an investment advisor, 
[Putnam] employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud clients or prospective 
clients . . . .”).  
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dealing securities trading—using non-pubic information to engage 
in market-timing—by several of its employees to investors in the 
mutual funds.344 The Commission further found that Putnam 
failed to detect and deter such trading activity through internal 
controls and failed to supervise its investment management 
professionals.345 Putnam consented to the entry of the 
Commission's order without admitting or denying its findings and 
agreed not to contest the SEC’s findings.346 It ultimately paid $55 
million to settle the SEC claims.347  
More importantly, for purposes of this Article, the SEC 
demanded, and Putnam agreed to, a series of wide-ranging 
corporate governance reforms.348 Putnam agreed to enhance the 
independence of its board, enhance shareholder voting power and 
disclosures, and supply support staff to board members to assist in 
their monitoring duties.349 The firm also agreed to make certain 
enhancements to its compliance including the creation of a 
reporting obligation from the firm’s chief compliance officer to the 
board, the creation of new committees for ethics and compliance, 
and the periodic retention of an independent consultant to review 
compliance policies and procedures.350 Thus, like the federal bank 
                                                                                                     
 344. In re Putnam Investments LLC, Administrative Proceeding No. 3-11317, 
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 13, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-
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make “real and substantial” reforms in order to better protect mutual fund 
investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 350. See id. (enumerating the various areas of compliance Putnam agreed to 
reform as a result of the SEC’s order). 
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regulators, the SEC routinely exercises its regulatory power to 
achieve superior compliance, risk management, and corporate 
governance in wayward registrants and regulated entities.351 
The federal financial regulators, however, segregated the 
issue of diversity to the extreme margins of their respective 
regulatory activities, examinations, and regulatory processes. As 
previously mentioned, the Dodd–Frank Act directs the federal 
financial regulators to promulgate standards for “assessing the 
diversity policies” of regulated entities, and the regulators turned 
away from the plain meaning of the statute to create a “self-
assessment.”352 Congress could not have meant “self-assessment,” 
otherwise there would be no need for the statutory language in 
Section 342(b)(4) of the Dodd–Frank Act, stating that the 
assessment could not alone be used for any mandate regarding 
“lending policies” or “to require any specific action based on the 
findings of the assessment.”353 This provision is meaningless and 
redundant in the context of self-assessments.354 Worse, the federal 
financial regulators state within the Joint Guidelines that “[t]he 
agencies will not use their examination or supervisory processes in 
connection with these Standards.”355 Further, the agencies state 
that the Joint Guidelines do not “create any new legal 
obligation.”356 It is as if Congress simply directed the agencies to 
promulgate voluntary guidelines for regulated entities to 
undertake self-assessments of optional diversity policies. 
                                                                                                     
 351. See, e.g., supra notes 343–350 and accompanying text (outlining the 
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 352. Compare Dodd–Frank Act § 342(b)(2)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5452(b)(2)(C) 
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We suggest an alternative to breathe life into Section 342 in 
accordance with the plain meaning of Section 342. In accordance 
with the preexisting powers held by the federal financial 
regulators (discussed above),357 federal financial regulators should 
use their examination and supervisory powers to assess the 
diversity policies of regulated entities under the standards 
promulgated in the Joint Guidelines.358 Then, if those policies are 
sufficiently deficient that they form a basis—combined with all 
other facts and deficiencies found by the regulators—for adverse 
comments in examination reports, then such deficiencies should be 
treated as any other regulatory issue.359 Finally, in seeking to 
enhance risk management, legal and regulatory compliance, as 
well as ethicality, the regulators should require more aggressive 
efforts at diversification at miscreant firms that violate laws and 
regulations related to those areas. This approach effectively 
vindicates the act of Congress. 
It also vindicates the essential purpose of the Dodd–Frank Act 
overall. Based upon the empirical evidence developed in Part III of 
this Article, diversity is essential to appropriate risk management, 
particularly compliance and ethics risk management. 
Consequently, sound diversity management vindicates 
macroprudential regulation, macroeconomic stability and growth, 
and the essential publicness of the financial sector. In sum, our 
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This fully actualizes Section 342(b)(4). 
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approach squares the statutory language of Section 342 with the 
essential purposes of Dodd–Frank and the best learning extant on 
the potential of cultural diversity. 
VII. Conclusion 
Congress correctly identified a major blind spot on Wall 
Street—a culturally homogenous elite prone to herd behavior, 
groupthink, and affinity bias.360 These maladies exacted a heavy 
cost upon the rest of the nation in the context of the financial crisis, 
which was marked by a mindless real estate bubble, dubious 
ethics, outright violations of laws and regulations, and the worst 
risk mismanagement in our nation’s history. There is no certainty 
that a more culturally diverse financial sector would have entirely 
prevented the crisis or dramatically lessened its effects. Embracing 
the full spectrum of cultural diversity allows firms to access and 
balance the full spectrum of perspectives and experiences that 
support superior cognition, especially with respect to risk, ethics, 
and compliance. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies strongly suggest that a more 
culturally diverse financial sector could have reduced subprime 
lending, limited the extent of the real estate bubble, limited the 
essential lawlessness of the financial sector, and enhanced ethical 
decision making.361 These empirical studies are either based upon 
actual learning from the financial crisis or sophisticated 
experiments simulating market behavior.362 While omitted 
variables can never be ruled out and disentangling causation from 
mere correlation is always challenging, the studies carefully 
control for many factors and boast careful designs expressly to 
                                                                                                     
 360. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (exploring the difficulties 
and ramifications of group think and herd behavior in financial institutions).  
 361. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (reviewing multiple studies 
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limit such concerns.363 In all events, a thoroughgoing embrace of 
cultural diversity will certainly yield superior social and economic 
outcomes relative to the financial crisis yielded by culturally 
monolithic financial firms. Viewed from the perspective of that 
crisis in capitalism, it is impossible for cultural diversity to fail.  
Consequently, we suggest that the financial regulators modify 
the basic approach of the Joint Guidelines and fully integrate them 
into all aspects of their examination and supervisory processes. 
Further, firms should face legal obligations with respect to 
diversity to the extent that mismanagement of diversity 
contributes to unsafe and unsound practices or creates an 
environment and culture of unlawful conduct. The regulators 
should also proactively require stronger diversity measures for 
firms sanctioned for unlawful behavior or risk mismanagement as 
part of negotiated enforcement outcomes. 
This more robust approach to Congress’s directive with respect 
to diversity is far more consistent with the plain meaning of 
Section 342. It also fully vindicates the macroeconomic, 
macroprudential, and publicness concerns that animate the Dodd–
Frank Act. A more diverse financial sector is bound to allocate 
capital better, achieve greater systemic stability, and meet the 
public’s expectations of the financial sector. 
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